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ABSTRACT
When Justice Elena Kagan announced that “we’re all
textualists now,” she was referring to a method of statutory
interpretation known as textualism. Textualism is one of four
methods of statutory interpretation. The other methods are:
intentionalism, purposivism, and legal pragmatism. During the
confirmation process, Justice Amy Coney Barrett was asked by
Senators whether she was committed to a “textualist theory” of
statutory interpretation, and whether she shared the judicial
philosophy of Justice Scalia. But why is the method of statutory
interpretation that a judge chooses so important? It is important
because most cases that come before federal courts today involve
issues of statutory interpretation, and the method of interpretation a
judge chooses can determine the outcome of a case. This article will
argue that textualism is preferable to the other three methods of
statutory interpretation, especially legal pragmatism.
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INTRODUCTION
When Justice Elena Kagan announced that “we’re all textualists
now,” she was referring to a method of statutory interpretation, pioneered
by Justice Scalia, known as textualism.1 During the Supreme Court
confirmation process, Justice Amy Coney Barrett was asked about her
“commitment to a textualist theory,”2 and whether she shared Justice
Scalia’s judicial philosophy.3 But why is the method that a judge chooses
to decide a case so important? It is because most cases that come before
federal courts today involve issues of statutory interpretation,4 and the
method of interpretation a court chooses can determine the outcome of a
case.5
This article has three purposes. One purpose is to define textualism,
as well as three other methods of statutory interpretation. Another
purpose is to provide examples of textualism by quoting from judicial
opinions, academic writings, and testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. However, the primary purpose of this article is to provide
twenty reasons why textualism is preferable to other methods of statutory
interpretation, especially legal pragmatism. In particular, this article will
discuss five reasons why textualism is preferable to purposivism, four
reasons why textualism is preferable to intentionalism, and eleven
reasons why textualism is preferable to legal pragmatism.

1
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of
Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 303, 304–05 (2017) [hereinafter
O’Scannlain, All Textualists].
2
Senate Committee for the Judiciary, Nomination of Amy Coney Barrett to
the U.S. Supreme Court, Barrett Responses to Questions for the Record, Questions
from
Sen.
Mazie
K.
Hirono,
at
6
(Oct.
16,
2020),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Barrett%20Responses%20to%20Q
FRs.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M5R-5C5K].
3
Senate Committee for the Judiciary, Nomination of Amy Coney Barrett to
the U.S. Supreme Court, Barrett Responses to Questions for the Record, Questions
from
Sen.
Feinstein,
at
1
(Oct.
16,
2020),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Barrett%20Responses%20to%20Q
FRs.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VGF-5GN7].
4
STEPHEN BREYER, THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT AND THE PERIL OF POLITICS
34 (2021) (“most of the cases the Court decides concern the interpretation of words
in federal statutes.”); Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System:
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 13–14 (Amy
Gutmann ed. 1997) (“By far the greatest part of what I and all federal judges do is to
interpret the meaning of federal statutes and federal agency regulations.”).
5
See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991)
(discussed infra notes 54-58) (Hospital seeking to recover expert witness fees would
have won, if the Court had followed the purposivist approach Justice Stevens argued
for in his dissent, rather than the textualist approach relied on by the majority).
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The structure of this article is in four parts. Part I will define
textualism, along with two other foundational theories of statutory
interpretation. Part II will define legal pragmatism. Part III will discuss
reasons why textualism is preferable to purposivism and intentionalism.
Part IV will provide reasons why textualism is preferable to legal
pragmatism and briefly discuss the fact that political liberals can be
conservative jurists.

I. DEFINITION OF TEXTUALISM, AND OTHER FOUNDATIONAL
THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Textualism is one of three foundational theories of statutory
interpretation.6 The other two foundational theories are legislative intent
(“intentionalism”) and legislative purpose (“purposivism”).7 These
approaches are considered foundational because they each emphasize
one ground, or “foundation,” as a basis for statutory interpretation.8 In
addition to these foundational approaches, other judges follow a fourth
approach to statutory interpretation known as legal pragmatism.
Pragmatism – which has been characterized as “antifoundational”9 –will
be discussed following a discussion of the three foundational theories.

A. Definition of Textualism
Textualism is the most popular of the foundational theories of
statutory interpretation.10 Judges and scholars have emphasized a variety
6
JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION 22 (2017).
7
Id.
8
Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation ProEnvironmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking is Better than Judicial
Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1231, 1235 n.12 (1996).
9
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 153 (1999).
10
John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1, 73 (2014) (“the Court’s predominant approach to statutory
interpretation has, for the last quarter century, been textualist.”) [hereinafter,
Manning, Foreword]. Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Barrett and Kavanaugh are
textualists. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to
be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 458 (Mar. 23, 2017) (Law Professor
Jonathan Turley testified that Neil Gorsuch “is a textualist.”) [hereinafter Gorsuch
Confirmation Hearing]; see also Abbe R. Gluck, Reading the ACA’S Findings:
Textualism, Severability and the ACA’S Return to the Court, 130 YALE L.J. FORUM
132, 164 (2020) (describing Justice Kavanaugh as “a noted textualist.”); Thomas
Jipping, On Judge Barrett, Let’s Tell the Truth, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 26, 2020),
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/on-judge-barrett-lets-tell-the-truth/ []
(“Barrett is committed to an approach to interpretation that minimizes the influence
of her personal views. The heart of that approach is textualism . . . .”); Scott A.
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of factors to describe textualism. One textualist judge emphasizes that
“statutory text” should provide the foundation for statutory meaning.11 A
textualist Supreme Court justice emphasizes that a court’s inquiry should
begin and end with the statutory text.12 This means that a federal statute
is not merely a point of departure (or “springboard”) for a court to move
beyond the text into the realm of judicial lawmaking.13 Instead,
textualists believe that the job of a court is to follow the law contained in
the text of the statute, not change it to conform “with the judge’s view of
sound policy.”14 Other textualists emphasize that only the text of the
statute has been enacted into law, and extrinsic material, such as
legislative history;15 what a judge thinks a statute should say;16 or

Moss, Judges’ Varied Views on Textualism: The Roberts-Alito Schism and the
Similar District Judge Divergence That Undercuts the Widely Assumed TextualismIdeology Correlation, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7 (2017) (“Justice Alito has joined the
Scalia/Thomas textualist camp, while Chief Justice Roberts definitely has not.”).
11
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994) (“statutory text and
structure…supply the proper foundation for meaning.”)[hereinafter Easterbrook,
Text History]; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 56 (2012) (discussing the “Supremacy-of-Text
Principle”).
12
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note note 11, at 16.
13
Id. at 17; see also SCALIA, supra note 4, at 25. In sharp contrast to
textualists, great pragmatic jurists (like Justice Benjamin Cardozo), believe that the
legislative policy contained in a statute can itself be “a source of law, a new
generative impulse transmitted to the legal system.” Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing
Co., 300 U.S. 342, 351 (1937).
14
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at
xxi.
15
Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)
(“As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the
legislative history or any other extrinsic material.”); see also Manning, Foreword,
supra note 10, at 74 (referring to “the key textualist position that interpreters cannot
use legislative history to contradict the enacted text,” but also noting that “the Court
still consults legislative history as a potential tool for resolving ambiguity.”)
However, see Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1075-1076
(2022)(Kavanaugh, J. concurring) criticizing the ambiguity trigger on the ground
“that ambiguity is in the eye of the beholder and cannot be readily determined on an
objective basis.”)
16
Amy Coney Barrett, 2019 Sumner Canary Memorial Lecture: Assorted
Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis: Redux, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 855,
856 (2020) [hereinafter Barrett, Assorted Canards] (“textualists emphasize that
words mean what they say, not what a judge thinks they ought to say . . . Fidelity to
the law means fidelity to the text as it is written.” (emphasis added)); see also
O’Scannlain, All Textualists, supra note 1, at 304 (quoting Justice Kagan who
explained that, before textualism, an early approach to statutory interpretation asked,
“‘what should this statute be,’ rather than what do ‘the words on the paper say.’”).
Justice Kagan also explained that “the entire judicial endeavor was ‘policy-
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abstract notions of “doing justice,”17 should be rejected as the basis of
statutory interpretation.
As the examples above illustrate, textualists are generally opposed
to relying on external sources to interpret a statute.18 Instead, textualist
analysis focuses on the objective meaning of words contained in the text
of the statute.19 This is not to say that textualists rely only on the text of
a statute and nothing else. Textualists recognize that words in a statute
can only be understood in context.20 This can mean “semantic
context,”21 which includes looking at the historic, or (what this article
will call) “temporal” context. Specifically, textualists believe that words
used in the text of a statute should be interpreted according to what a
reasonable person would have understood the words to mean at the time
of a statute’s enactment.22
However, textualists are not blind literalists.23 Textualists rely
on the “ordinary meaning rule” as a basic rule of statutory
interpretation.24 The rule provides that words in a statute are not to be
interpreted according to their literal meaning, but rather according to
their ordinary meaning.25 This means that when a judge is faced with an
issue of statutory interpretation, the judge should apply the meaning that

orientated’ with judges . . . pretending to be congressmen.’” Id. 305 (emphasis
added).
17
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 57.
18
See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
19
SCALIA, supra note 4, at 17.
20
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 70, 79 (2006).
21
Id. at 76.
22
BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (2021) (“When
called to interpret a statute, this Court generally seeks to discern and apply the
ordinary meaning of its terms at the time of their adoption.” (emphasis added)); see
also New Prime Inc., v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 536 (2019) (which involved
interpretation of an exclusion in the federal Arbitration Act). The Court ruled in
favor of a truck driver, finding that when the Arbitration Act was passed in 1925,
that the “term, ‘contracts of employment’ referred to agreements to perform work
[and that the driver, who was working under an independent contractor agreement] is
entitled to the benefit of that same understanding today.” Id. at 543–44. The Court
went on to explain that there are two reasons for this “at the time” or temporal
characteristic of textualism. Id. at 539. First, “if judges could freely invest statutory
terms with new meanings, we would risk amending legislation outside the ‘single . .
. procedure’ the Constitution commands.” Id. Second, this could risk “upsetting
reliance interests in the settled meaning of a statute.” Id. (citations omitted).
23
SCALIA, supra note 4, at 24; see also Barrett, Assorted Canards, supra note
16, at 857 (“literalism strips language of its context”).
24
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 69.
25
Id.
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an ordinary person would understand from the text of a statute. 26 For
example, Justice Scalia dissented from a decision to allow the conviction
of a defendant (who offered to trade a gun for cocaine), because the
defendant was charged under a statute for using a firearm during a drug
trafficking crime.27 Justice Scalia argued that words in a statute should
be given their ordinary meaning, and that the ordinary meaning of “using
a firearm” means using it as a weapon, not “as an article of commerce.”28
In addition to the ordinary meaning rule, textualists also rely on the
dictionary definition of words as an aid to statutory interpretation.29
However, this does not mean that textualists approach statutory
interpretation using only a dictionary.30 Instead, dictionaries are tools
used to provide evidence that a term can “bear a certain meaning, not as
conclusive evidence of what a term means in context.”31
Textualists also use “canons” of statutory construction.32 An
example of a canon of construction is the “whole-text canon,” which
26

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.. INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 33 (2015); see also 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47:28 (7th ed. 2009) (The focus on common or ordinary meaning
is “on the statute’s meaning to people outside the legislature . . . ‘as the ordinary
man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed to him.’” (emphasis added));
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 69-71. (In instances where words have more
than one ordinary meaning, the rule presumes “that a thoroughly fluent reader can
reliably tell…from contextual and idiomatic clues which of several possible senses a
word or phrase bears.”). The ordinary meaning rule has been codified by some state
legislatures. See e.g., MISS. CODE § 1-3-65 (2021) (“All words and phrases contained
in the statutes are used according to their common and ordinary acceptation and
meaning…”); see also FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011) (“When a
statute does not define a term, we typically ‘give the phrase its ordinary meaning.’”)
(citation omitted). However, when a statute does include “‘an explicit definition, we
must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.’”
Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 490 (2020) (citations omitted).
27
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28
Id. at 242 n.1.
29
See, e.g., Elwell v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 693 F.3d 1303,
1306 (10th Cir. 2012).
30
Barrett, Assorted Canards, supra note 16, at 858.
31
Id. at 859.
32
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 53-339 (book provides examples
and explanations of fifty-seven (57) canons of statutory construction categorized as:
“fundamental principles” (id. at 53), “semantic canons” (id. at 69), “syntactic
canons” (id. at 140), “contextual canons” (id. at 167), “expected-meaning canons”
(id. at 247), “government-structuring canons” (id. at 278), “private-right canons” (id.
at 295), and “stabilizing-canons” (id. at 318). Canons 38 through 57 are specifically
“applicable to statutes . . . .” Id. at 243; see also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra
note 6, at 275–432 (discussing semantic canons, and substantive canons of
construction); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR, ABBE R. GLUCK, & VICTORIA F. NOURSE,
STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION 447 (2014) (dividing canons into
textual canons, substantive canons, and extrinsic canons).
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provides that, in interpreting a section of a statute, a court should look at
the language of the “statute as a whole.”33 Although textualists consider
canons important, they are not mandatory; textualists do not regard
canons as rules, but as “factors to be considered” and “tools of statutory
construction.”34
Another feature of textualism is reliance on the plain meaning
rule.35 This rule provides that if the text of a statute is clear, or “plain,”
then it should be applied as it is written unless this would lead to an
absurdity.36 It is important to note that although the plain meaning rule is
limited by the “absurdity doctrine,”37 absurdity does not mean “bad
legislative choices.”38
33

SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 167.
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001); see also SCALIA
& GARNER, supra note 11, at 51 (“canons of interpretation…are not ‘rules’ . . . .”);
see also id. at 212 (a canon “is not a rule of law but one of various factors to be
considered in the interpretation of a text.”). An example of a textualist justice’s use
of canons of construction is contained in Yates v. United States. 574 U.S. 528, 549–
50 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring). Yates involved the issue of whether a fisherman
violated a section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (prohibiting the destruction of a
tangible object with the intent to impede a federal investigation), by throwing
undersized fish back into the ocean. Id. at 531. The majority ruled in favor of the
fisherman, deciding that “tangible objects” only included objects that could “record
or preserve information.” Id. at 532. Textualist Justice Alito concurred in the
judgment by relying on two canons of construction. Id. He explained that:
34

traditional tools of statutory construction confirm that [the
fisherman] has the better argument. . . . Section 1519 [of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act] refers to “any record, document, or tangible
object.” The noscitur a sociis canon instructs that when a statute
contains a list, each word in that list presumptively has a
“similar” meaning. A related canon, ejusdem generis, teaches that
general words following a list of specific words should usually be
read . . . to mean something “similar.” Applying these canons to
§1519’s list of nouns, the term “tangible object” should refer to
something similar to records or documents. A fish does not spring
to mind—nor does an antelope . . ..
Id. at 549–50 (Alito, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 381 (2013).
36
Id.
37
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388
(2003) (“judges may deviate from even the clearest statutory text when a given
application would otherwise produce “absurd results.”); see, e.g., Pub. Citizen v.
Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 471 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (a classic
example of “true absurdity” is “where a sheriff was prosecuted for obstructing the
mails even though he was executing a warrant to arrest the mail carrier for murder . .
. .”).
38
See In re Miller, 493 B.R. 55, 60–61 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013) (the absurdity
doctrine’s “concern is ‘linguistic rather than substantive’ . . . . The doctrine is not a
35
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Textualists also believe in legislative supremacy.39 Legislative
supremacy is a doctrine which provides that when a court takes on the
role of statutory interpreter, its role is subordinate to that of the
legislature.40 The foundation of legislative supremacy is in Article I of
the Constitution.41 The doctrine is designed to preclude “judicial
policymaking” when a statute clear.42
An important characteristic of the doctrine of legislative supremacy
(as well as textualism itself) is that textualist judges believe that they
should still follow the text of a statute, even if they may not personally
like the result of a decision they make.43 Textualist Justice Gorsuch
emphasized this when he testified that “a judge who likes every outcome
he reaches is probably a pretty bad judge, stretching for policy results he
prefers rather than those the law compels.”44 Similarly, about the
doctrine of legislative supremacy, a law professor explained that “the
court must give way, even if its own view of public policy is quite
different.” 45

B. Definition of Purposivism
In addition to textualism, a second foundational theory of
statutory interpretation is legislative purpose.46 As their name suggests,
purposivists go beyond the words contained in the statute’s text and
focus on a statute’s overall purpose or “general aims.”47 Specifically,

license to correct what appear to courts to be bad legislative choices. . . . A statute
that can be applied as written must be.”).
39
MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 6, at 55–56.
40
Legislative supremacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also
Lady Justice Mary Arden, Magna Carta and the Judges-Why Magna Carta Matters,
in MAGNA CARTA: MUSE & MENTOR 185 (Randy Holland ed. 2014) (England has a
similar doctrine known as Parliamentary sovereignty which means that: “judges
cannot develop the law so that it contradicts a statute.”).
41
REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 9
(1975); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States . . . .”).
42
Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEO. L.J. 281, 282 (1989) [hereinafter Farber, Statutory Interpretation ]
43
See, e.g., Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 10, at 67.
44
Id. (emphasis added). See also .; see also Morgan Chalfant, Barrett Accepts
Nomination, Says Judges Must Be ‘Resolute’ in Setting Aside Personal Beliefs, THE
HILL (Sept. 26, 2020) (Textualist Judge Barrett announced that “A judge must apply
the law as written. Judges are not policymakers and they must be resolute in setting
aside any policy views they might hold[.]”), available at 2020 WL 5746404.
45
Farber, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 42, at 292.
46
MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 6, at 22.
47
See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 60 (2009).
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purposivists believe that statutes should “be interpreted to achieve the
broad purposes that their drafters had in mind,”48 and that “primacy
should be given to the perceived spirit of a statute— even at the expense
of the letter of the law.”49 An example of a purposivist approach to
statutory interpretation was provided by a witness who appeared before
the Senate Judiciary Committee to oppose the confirmation of textualist
Judge Gorsuch. Witness Guerino J. Calemine is the general counsel of
the Communications Workers of America.50 In a discussion of two
worker cases that then-Tenth Circuit Judge Gorsuch decided, Mr.
Calemine testified that “the purpose of the laws is to protect workers’
health and safety,” and those purposes should guide the interpretation of
those laws, not the Oxford English Dictionary.51 In short, unlike
textualists who focus on the text,52 purposivists focus on policy context.53
Another example of a purposivist approach to statutory
interpretation is provided in West Virginia Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Casey.54
The case involved the issue of whether expert witness fees could be
recovered by a hospital under a federal statute which only provided
recovery for attorney’s fees.55 Purposivist Justice Stevens argued that the
Court’s failure to include expert fees would be contrary to the remedial
purpose of the statute,56 and that the Court’s decision that the hospital
must assume the cost is “at war with the congressional purpose of
making the prevailing party whole.”57 Writing for the majority, textualist
Justice Scalia instead declared:

48

BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 803 (2016).
NEIL GORSUCH, A REPUBLIC IF YOU CAN KEEP IT 137 (2019).
50
Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 10, at 418–19.
51
Id. at 442.
52
Int’l FC Stone Fin. Inc. v. Jacobson, 950 F.3d 491, 498 (7th Cir. 2020)
(“defendants ask us to do something we cannot: place a law’s purpose above its text.
‘We as judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals have only the power to interpret the law;
it is the duty of the legislative branch to make the law.’ (citations omitted) . . . ‘It is
our function to give the statute the effect its language suggests, however modest that
may be; not to extend it to admirable purposes it might be used to
achieve.’…[P]etitioners’ purposive argument simply cannot overcome the force of
plain text.” id. at 499) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
53
GORSUCH, supra note 49, at 142-143; see also Craig v. Bridges Bros.
Trucking LLC, 823 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2016) (“FLSA [Fair Labor Standards
Act] rights cannot be abridged . . . or waived because this would nullify the purposes
of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.”)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
54
499 U.S. 83 (1991).
55
Id. at 87–88.
56
Id. at 107–08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57
Id. at 111.
49
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West Virginia Hospital “argues that the congressional purpose in
enacting § 1988 must prevail over the ordinary meaning of the
statutory terms…however,…The best evidence of that purpose is the
statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress…Congress could
easily have…[included] expert witness fees…it chose instead to
enact more restrictive language, and we are bound by that
restriction.”58

C. Definition of Intentionalism
A third foundational theory of statutory interpretation is legislative
intent, or “intentionalism.”59
Intentionalists believe that, when
interpreting a statute, a court should “ascertain the legislature’s intent
underlying the statute,”60 and then determine “what the legislature would
have specifically intended if it had” been faced with the particular issue
before the court.61 This approach relies on “‘imaginative reconstruction’
… [which] involves the judge attempting to enter the shoes of the
[original] legislators and discern their intent at the time, and how they
would have wanted the statute applied to the case before the court.”62
To do this, intentionalists go outside the text of the statute and
examine extrinsic sources such as legislative history.63 Such an approach
invites attorneys and judges to inquire into whether – in choosing words
to put in the text of a statute – “the legislature might have misspoken,” or
that the statute was not “carefully drafted” because certain words were
“supposed to be there.”64
58

Id. at 98–99 (emphasis added).
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 690 (2007);
MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 6, at 22.
60
CROSS, supra note 47, at 59.
61
MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 6, at 22 (emphasis in the original).
62
CROSS, supra note 47, at 61; see also ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 59, at 214.
Professor Eskridge goes on to caution that as judicial inquiry into the “actual
specific intent” of a statute is hard to discover, it “becomes steadily more abstracted
from specific intent . . . and perhaps more driven by nonlegislator value choices,
hence in tension with the rule of law.” (emphasis added). Professor Eskridge’s
observation is important because it shows an awareness that judges can make
decisions based on judge made “value choices”.
63
Theo I. Ogune, Judges and Statutory Construction 30 U. BALT. LAW
FORUM 4, 16 (2000) (“intentionalism thrives on the use of legislative history…”)
[hereinafter Ogune, Statutory Construction]; see also MANNING & STEPHENSON,
supra note 6, at 182–89 (providing an actual example of legislative history used to
discern legislative intent).
64
SCALIA, supra note 4, at 16 (If one proceeds on the theory that the goal of
statutory interpretation is to determine “what the legislature intended rather than
what it said . . . [then one could inquire whether] [i]n selecting the words of the
statute, the legislature might have misspoken.”); see, e.g., Transcript of Oral
59
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Intentionalism is different from textualism, not only because it
looks beyond the text of a statute to external sources (such as legislative
history), but also because it is subjective.65 The focus of intentionalists is
on the subjective intent of legislators.66 This is in contrast to textualism,
which is objective; its focus is on an objective legal writing.67
Specifically, while intentionalists focus on the intent or meaning of a
statute to the members of Congress who wrote it, textualists focus on the
meaning of the words to “the people” who will read it.68 In short,
intentionalism is “writer-centered”, whereas textualism is “readercentered.”69 As a result, textualists like Justice Amy Coney Barrett see
themselves as “faithful to the law rather than the lawgiver.” 70

Argument, Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017) (No. 16–399),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcript/2016/16399_3f14.pdf [hereinafter Perry Transcript]. The Perry case grew out of a so-called
“mixed action” involving a discrimination claim and a civil service claim brought by
a civil service employee named Anthony Perry. Perry, 137 S. Ct. at 1979. During
oral argument, the employee’s attorney was asked which part of a statute (5 U.S.C. §
7703) provided the authority for a district court to hear a civil service claim. Perry
Transcript at 10. The employee’s attorney argued that the statute at issue was not
“carefully drafted,” and that the statute did not contain words that are “supposed to”
be there. Id. at 11, line 26. The intentionalist argument in Perry was that even though
words were not put into the text of the statute stating that “mixed actions” could be
tried in district courts, nevertheless, that was the intention of Congress, and that
intention should be enforced by the court. Perry, 137 S. Ct. at 1979–80.
65
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419,
425 (2005). [hereinafter Manning, Legislative Intent]
66
See Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar,
J., concurring) (Textualist Judge Thapar declared that “‘Congress designed the Act
(ERISA) in a specific way, and it is not our proper role to redesign the statute.’. . .
[T]he subjective intent of the elected officials who enacted the statute is irrelevant.”
(emphasis added) (quoting Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. 139 S.
Ct. 524, 530 (2019)).
67
DICKERSON, supra note 41, at 83 (The classification of approaches to
statutory interpretation as either objective or subjective is determined by “whether
the pursuer of meaning [e.g., a textualist] is preoccupied with the statute itself (an
objective legal writing) or [if the pursuer of meaning, e.g., an intentionalist is
preoccupied] with the actual, and therefore subjective intent of the legislature.”) ; see
also Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, supra note 65, at 424 (“textualists
focus on ‘objectified intent’—the import that a reasonable person conversant with
applicable social and linguistic conventions would attach to the enacted words.”).
68
Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 2193, 2195 (2017) [hereinafter Barrett, Congressional Insiders].
69
Morell E. Mullins, Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory
Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 20 (2004).
70
Barrett, Congressional Insiders, supra note 68, at 2195. A focus on the law,
rather than the intent of the lawgiver, is also a characteristic of originalism after
Justice Scalia. See O’Scannlain, All Textualists, supra note 1, at 309 (describing
originalism as a cousin of textualism, and noting that Justice Scalia “made
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As well as being different from textualism, intentionalism is also
distinct from purposivism.
Purposivism is more general than
intentionalism. Purposivists focus on a statute’s broad purpose, and on
the “social problems the legislature was addressing [along with]…the
general ends it was seeking….”71 Intentionalists are more specific.72
They are concerned with historical evidence showing “how legislators
understood the meaning of the words” contained in the statue they were
enacting.73 Another difference is that intentionalists are backward
looking, whereas purposivists are forward looking. An intentionalist
judge “projects the current facts [of the case before the court] back to the
now-departed legislature and asks how it would have applied the law to
the facts.”74 In contrast, a purposivist judge “projects the legislature
forward to make a guess about how it would apply the statute to the facts
today.”75

II. DEFINITION OF LEGAL PRAGMATISM
In addition to the three foundational approaches, legal pragmatism
provides a fourth and very different method of statutory interpretation.

originalism a respected means of analysis . . . [he emphasized] original public
meaning, rather than what went on in the heads of the Founders…)(emphasis added).
71
Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 COLO. L. REV. 225,
227 (1999) [hereinafter, Strauss, Common Law]; see also Abby Wright, For All
Intents and Purposes: What Collective Intention Tells Us About Congress and
Statutory Interpretation, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 983, 992 (2006) [hereinafter Wright,
Statutory Interpretation] (discussing the difference between legislative purpose and
legislative intent by explaining that legislative purpose is what a legislator “hopes
will change about the world by means of enacting the legislation . . . [while
legislative intent is] what Congress intends the direct effect of the legislation to be.”
Id. For example, as its name suggests, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act
of 1976 (42 U.S.C. §1988 (b)) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees in certain civil
rights cases. As linguist and former Supreme Court law clerk, Abby Wright explains,
the “[l]egislative intent [of the statute] . . . would be the direct result that attorneys
be awarded fees if representing the prevailing party.” Id. (emphasis added). The
legislative purpose is the “secondary effect the statute seeks to bring about,” such as
increasing “the number of attorneys willing to take civil rights cases.” Id.) (emphasis
added).
72
Wright, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 71, at 992; see also Timothy P.
Terrell, Statutory Epistemology: Mapping the Interpretative Debate, 53 EMORY L.J.
523, 532–33 (2004) (describing specific intent as “the most legitimate basis for an
‘intentionalist’ theory…”)(emphasis added).
73
Strauss, Common Law, supra note 71 at 227; see also MANNING &
STEPHENSON, supra note 6, at 22 (“purposivists view specific legislative intent-what
the legislators would have done if they had confronted the precise question at issueas illusory or too difficult to reconstruct.”) (emphasis added).
74
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 248 (2005).
75
Id.
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Although pragmatism can take a variety of forms, most forms of
pragmatism are based on a preference for practical, “nonlegalistic”
decision-making.76 Instead of legal theory, pragmatists focus on the
results77 or consequences of any legal decision.78 This focus on
consequences has led some to refer to the pragmatic approach to
statutory interpretation as “consequentialism.”79 In deciding a case, the
goal of consequentialist judges is to choose an outcome which supports
what they consider to be the best policy result.80
A. Judge Posner’s Description of Pragmatic Decision-making
An iconic leader of the pragmatic approach to statutory
interpretation is the distinguished and scholarly former Seventh Circuit
Judge Richard A. Posner. Judge Posner explained his pragmatic
approach to judicial decision-making when he appeared at a law school
conference shortly after the Gorsuch nomination and explained the
“unorthodox” (his word) way that he decided cases.81 In response to a
question, Judge Posner stated that:
I am not actually very interested in legal doctrines82
[portion of transcript omitted]

76

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 26 (1990)
[hereinafter POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE]; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES
THINK 7–8 (2008) (in contrast to pragmatists, Judge Posner describes judges who
apply pre-existing rules, do not legislate, do not exercise discretion, and do not look
outside conventional legal texts as “legalists”).
77
Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1653, 1664 (1990) [hereinafter Posner, Offer Law] (Pragmatists “are interested in
using the legislative and constitutional text as a resource in the fashioning of a
pragmatically attractive result”); see also David Luban, What’s Pragmatic About
Legal Pragmatism? 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 45 (1996) (“legal pragmatism is . . .
result-orientated”);
78
Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L.
REV. 519, 539 (2012) [hereinafter Posner, Self-Restraint] (Pragmatism “emphasizes
consequences over doctrine.”).
79
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 22 (“Another common replacement for
text is consequentialism, often referred to as pragmatism . . . .”).
80
GORSUCH, supra note 49, at 137.
81
See Pepperdine University, Pepperdine Law Review Symposium: Hon.
Richard
A.
Posner,
YOUTUBE
(Apr.
8,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Uiu27RxYWk [https://perma.cc/43VE-TE6W]
at 0:56:02 (last visited Sept. 28, 2020.
82
Id. at 0:56:05.
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So the way I approach a case is ask myself what is the sensible
outcome, forget about the law, what is the sensible outcome for
resolving this case in terms of one’s values, values that you feel are
widely held in society83 and so on and once I have the sensible
solution I ask myself is there anything that blocks this. Could there
be a Supreme Court decision or en banc decision of my court or
some really clear statute or clear constitutional provision that is still
being enforced? And if I’m blocked I’m blocked.84 But I don’t start
off by looking at statutes and this and that and all the what I think is
just the gibberish of legal doctrine like the way people talk about
legislation, the canons of construction…85…I have never cited a
canon of construction I don’t think they have the slightest value….86
[portion of transcript omitted]
But a lot of judges are, you know, much more legalistic and very
interested in the text, what an official text says that leads to, you
know, textualism, and it is just not my cup of tea.87

In addition to this oral explanation of legal pragmatism, Judge
Posner has provided much fuller explanations of pragmatism in his
books88 and law review articles. For example, in one law review article,
Judge Posner articulated three core elements of legal pragmatism: first,
“a distrust of metaphysical entities…[like] ‘truth’”;89 second, “that
propositions be tested by their consequences, ...”;90 and third, that
judging should be based on “conformity to social or other human needs
rather than to ‘objective,’ ‘impersonal’ criteria.”91 In another article, he
discussed “eight principles of legal pragmatism.”92 One of these
83

Id. at 0:56:09 (emphasis added).
Id. at 0:56:43.
85
Id. at 0:57:04.
86
Id. at 0:57:38.
87
Id. at 0:57:52 (emphasis added). Judge Posner emphasized some of the same
points he made above in an interview with the N.Y. Times shortly after his
retirement. See Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with Richard Posner, Judicial
Provocateur,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
11,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/us/politics/judge-richard-posnerretirement.html [https://perma.cc/YJ9P-ASPG] (“I pay very little attention to legal
rules, statutes, constitutional provisions. . . . The first thing you do is ask yourself—
forget about the law—what is the sensible resolution of this dispute?”).
88
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY
(2003).
89
Posner, Offer Law, supra note 77, at 1660.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1660–61.
92
Posner, Self-Restraint, supra note 78, at 540–42.
84
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principles states that “[l]aw is not limited to the body of orthodox legal
materials, and so the judicial function cannot be limited to deciding cases
in accordance with those materials. . . . .”93
Of course, Judge Posner is not the only jurist who is a legal
pragmatist. Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and William Brennan were
pragmatists too.94 Justice Stephen Breyer is also a pragmatist. This can
be seen in his scholarly writings.95 However, it is important to
emphasize, as Justice Breyer does, that there are different approaches to
legal pragmatism.96 This means that Justice Breyer’s pragmatism is not
necessarily the same as the pragmatism described by Judge Posner or
practiced by Justice O’Connor or Justice Brennan.
Having discussed the three foundational theories of statutory
interpretation, as well as a fourth theory known as legal pragmatism, this
article will now provide reasons why textualism is preferable to the two
foundational methods of statutory interpretation, as well as legal
pragmatism.

III. WHY TEXTUALISM IS PREFERABLE TO PURPOSIVISM AND
INTENTIONALISM
A. Five Reasons Why Textualism is Preferable to Purposivism
The first reason why textualism is preferable to purposivism is
because Congress enacts statutes; Congress does not enact purposes
independent of the statute itself.97 Such an approach would allow a judge
to unilaterally rewrite a federal statute by claiming to rely on an
unenacted congressional purpose.98
A second problem with a purposivist approach is that it may be
difficult to discern a statute’s overall legislative purpose. While
legislators may agree on the specific words contained in the text, they do

93

Id. at 540.
Beau James Brock, Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A Renaissance of Positivism
and Predictability in Constitutional Application, 51 LA. L. REV. 623, 629 (1991).
Judge Posner was Justice Brennan’s law clerk during the 1963 term. Richard A.
Posner, UNIV. CHICAGO SCH. LAW, https://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r
[https://perma.cc/9S7D-K32B] (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
95
STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 82 (2010) (“The
approach I have in mind can be described as pragmatic—as that concept is broadly
used to encompass efforts that consider and evaluate consequences.”).
96
Id. at xiv.
97
K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 325 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
98
John F. Manning, Justice Scalia and the Idea of Judicial Restraint, 115
MICH. L. REV. 747, 756 (2017) [hereinafter Manning, Judicial Restraint].
94
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so for their own purposes, and these purposes may be conflicting.99 The
only thing that legislators have agreed to when they vote to enact a bill
into law are the words contained in the text of the statute itself. 100 This
means that judges should owe “fidelity” to the text of a statute, since “we
are governed by what the legislators enacted, not by the purposes they
had in mind.”101
A third problem with purposivism is that it appears to disregard the
legislative process for enacting a bill into law contained in Article I. An
important part of that process is compromise.102 When a party tries to
invoke the purpose of a statute, and disregard the text of the statute itself,
this ignores the process of compromise.103 For example, in a case
involving the issue of whether the Court should authorize a private action
for damages (despite the fact that the statute at issue did not contain one),
the Supreme Court dismissed the claim declaring that lawmaking “often
demands compromise. . . .”104 The Court explained that a lawmaking
body may not wish to pursue a statute’s purpose, since this might disturb
the “balance of interests struck by lawmakers.”105 Similarly, Professor
John F. Manning wrote that before “the advent of modern textualism,
purposivism threatened the integrity of any resulting legislative
compromise by enforcing the spirit over the letter of the law—that is, the
statute’s apparent background purpose rather than the precise details
bargained for in the adopted text.”106
A fourth problem with a purposivist approach is that it can result in
statutory provisions becoming “boundless,” generalized purpose clauses
99
DICKERSON, supra note 41, at 90; see, e.g., Specialty Equip. Mkt. Ass’n v.
Ruckelshaus, 720 F.2d 124, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (referring to “the competing and
often conflicting purposes of the [Environmental Protection Act] statute.”)
100
Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and
Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1612 (2012) [hereinafter
Scalia & Manning, A Dialogue] (“Nothing but the text has received the approval of
the majority of the legislature and the President. . . . Nothing but the text reflects the
full legislature’s purpose. Nothing.”)
101
Id. at 1612.
102
Bd. Of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp. 474
U.S. 361, 374 (1986); see also United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 435 (2009)
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (“Invoking . . . Congress’s manifest purpose, however,
‘ignores the complexity of the problems Congress is called upon to address and the
dynamics of legislative action.’. . . Legislative enactments are the result of
negotiations between competing interests; ‘the final language of the legislation may
reflect hard fought compromises.’” (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
103
Id.
104
Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020).
105
Id. (emphasis added).
106
Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 65, at 425 n.53; see also Freeman
v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624, 637 (2012) (“Petitioners appeal to statutory
purpose. . .Vague notions of statutory purpose provide no warrant for expanding [the
statute’s] prohibition beyond the field to which it is unambiguously limited…”)
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which offer little predictability or guidance.107 Moreover, the source of
the statute’s “purpose” may not be reliable. For example, in Digital
Reality Trust, Inc. v. Somers,108 Justice Thomas was critical of the Court
for relying on “the supposed ‘purpose’ of the statute,” which it derived
primarily from a Senate committee report which members of the
committee did not write or vote on, and probably did not read.109
Finally, a fifth problem with a purposivist approach is that when a
court recognizes a claim based on the purpose of the law, it risks
“arrogating (taking) legislative power.”110 In fact, one theory underlying
purposivism is that judges should “partner” with the legislature to make
sure that a statute’s public policy purpose is achieved.111 The problem
with this theory is that it empowers purposivist judges to go beyond the
text of a statute and decide cases on the basis of “a preferred public
policy” (which the judge herself discerns) rather than the text.112
B. Four Reasons Why Textualism is Preferable to Intentionalism
There are four reasons why textualism is preferable to
intentionalism. First, Congress does “not enact intents,” Congress enacts

107
Rutledge v. Pharm. Care Mgt. Assn., 141 S. Ct. 474, 483 (2020) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
108
138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
109
Id. at 784 (Thomas, J., concurring) (Justice Thomas included quotations
from a Senate floor debate, as well as from a former Senate staffer who drafted
legislative history, and wrote that: “I ‘was able to write more or less what I pleased. .
. .[M]ost members of Congress…have no idea at all about what is in the legislative
history of a particular bill’”); see also Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 460
(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Any views contained in a committee report from one
house of Congress do not necessarily “represent those of all the Members of that
House. Many of them almost certainly did not read the report . . . much less agree
with it . . . .” (emphasis added)).
110
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 741.
111
O’Scannlain, All Textualists, supra note 1, at 305. Diarmuid O’Scannlain is
a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Judges of this Court
in Order of Seniority, U.S. CTS. NINTH CIR., https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/judicialcouncil/judges-seniority-list [https://perma.cc/9PBE-HVG3] (last visited Oct. 20,
2021).
112
O’Scannlain, All Textualists, supra note 1, at 305 (According to purposivist
thinkers “the task of the judge [was] to serve as the legislature’s partner, to ensure
that such purposes were carried out. This mindset empowered judges to break free
from the bonds of statutory text to ensure that a preferred public policy is
achieved.”); see also SCALIA, supra note 4, at 23 (“To be a textualist in good
standing, one need not be too dull to perceive the broader purposes that a statute is
designed . . . to serve. . . . One need only hold that judges have no authority to pursue
those broader purposes or write those new laws.”).
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statutory texts.113 When a president signs a bill into law, “it is only the
words of the bill” that become law, not the entire Congressional
Record.114 The only legislative intentions that should be recognized are
those that are part of “the final statutory text.”115 Only those intentions
have survived the legislative process, not policy intentions.116
A second reason why textualism is preferable to intentionalism is
because (in their search for legislative intent), intentionalists rely on
legislative history.117 Legislative history includes sources such as Senate
and House committee reports and congressional floor debates.118 The
problem with relying on legislative history is that it can be easily
manipulated.119 Legislators and lobbyists can put comments in the
record “solely to influence future interpretations.”120
113

Livingston Rebuild Ctr., Inc. v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 970 F.2d 295, 298 (7th Cir.

1992).
114
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distilling Corp. 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
115
Manning, Legislative Intent, supra note 65, at 424.
116
Id. (“intentionalists believe that legislatures have coherent and identifiable
but unexpressed policy intentions, textualists believe that the only meaningful
collective legislative intentions are those reflected in the public meaning of the final
statutory text.”) (emphasis added).
117
See, supra note 63.
118
Legislative History, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The
proceedings leading to the enactment of a statute, including hearings, committee
reports, and floor debates.”)
119
John M. Walker, Jr. Judicial Tendencies in Statutory Construction:
Differing Views on the Role of the Judge, 58 N.Y.U. AM. SURV. AM. L. 203, 234
(2001) [hereinafter Walker, Judicial Tendencies] (legislative history “can be easily
manipulated by legislators, judges, and lobbyists…”). However, U.S. Second Circuit
Court Judge John M. Walker distinguishes between legislative history and statutory
history based on the fact that statutory history is “more objectively determined and
less susceptible to manipulation…than legislative history…” id. at 234 (emphasis on
the word statutory in the original). This is because statutory history consists of “the
record and results of votes taken, bills passed or not passed…[it] accounts for the
collective action of the legislature…” id. at 234 (emphasis added). This makes
statutory history “less susceptible to judicial and legislative manipulation than
legislative history.“ id. Judge Walker adds that “to understand a statute’s ambiguous
terms, it may be helpful to look at drafts of a statute.” Id. at 233 (emphasis on the
word ambiguous in the original). The reader is asked to notice how the judge’s use
of history is limited. He appears to be only in favor of using specific statutory
history— e.g.,“drafts of a statute”—and then only to understand a statute’s
ambiguous terms.
120
Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1017 (1992); see also Exxon Mobil Corp., v. Allapattah
Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (relying on legislative history may allow
“unrepresentative committee members-or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists
– both the power and the incentive . . . to secure results they were unable to achieve
through the statutory text.”); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989)
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In addition, legislative history can diminish the text of a statute
which has actually been enacted into law.121 This is because legislative
history causes the words of the statute itself to be devalued, since it is
precisely those committee reports and debates which have been
“deliberately left out of the enacted text.”122 When a court looks beyond
the text and examines legislative history, this reduces the actual text to
“only one of many indicators of legislative intent.”123 This can shift a
court’s focus away from the legislature’s actual intent (contained in the
text of a statute), to an intent of the court’s own choosing.124
Another problem with intentionalists relying on legislative history
in particular, and extrinsic materials in general, is that “statutes are law,
extrinsic materials are not.”125 The fact that legislative history is not law
is why Justice Scalia believed that the greatest defect in using legislative
history as a basis for statutory interpretation was its illegitimacy.126
Illegitimacy is the third reason why textualism is preferable to
intentionalism.127 Textualist Judge Frank H. Easterbrook also objects to
the use of legislative history as “illegitimate” since it is “‘insufficient to
constitute legislation under our system of governance.’ An opinion poll
among legislators does not create a legal obligation. . . .”128
(Scalia, J., concurring) (congressional committee reports can contain references to
cases inserted “by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist;
and the purpose of those references was…to influence judicial
construction.”)(emphasis added); see also Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union
No. 474 v. N.L.R.B., 814 F.2d 697, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J., concurring)
(the use of legislative history can encourage legislators “to salt the legislative record
with unilateral interpretations of statutory provisions they were unable to persuade
their colleagues to accept.”).
121
Easterbrook, Text History, supra note 11, at 62.
122
Id.; see also Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distilling Corp. 341 U.S. 384,
396 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) (For the Court to select statements from floor
debates “as a basis for making up our minds what law Congress intended to enact is
to substitute ourselves for the Congress in one of its most important functions.”).
123
McIntosh v. Watkins, 441 P.3d 1094, 1105 n.23 (Okla. 2019) (Wyrick,
V.C.J., dissenting).
124
Id. at 1105. (The majority of the court “views the text of the statute as
merely one of many pieces of evidence—and a piece that can seemingly be
discarded altogether once a declaration of ambiguity is made—the Court finds itself
entirely unconstrained in assigning to the Legislature the intent of its choosing.”)
125
MICHAEL B.W. SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 103
(2000) (emphasis on the word “law” in the original). Professor Sinclair went on to
quote Justice Holmes’ famous statement that: “‘We do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.’” Id. (emphasis added) (citing
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920)).
126
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
127
Id.
128
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 91 (2017) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Absence of Method].
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The fact that legislative history is not law is particularly important
when a judge interprets a criminal statute. For example, while both
textualist Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred in an opinion (that a
juvenile defendant who stole a car and fatally injured a two-year-old
child should be given a lesser sentence), they were critical of the
majority for relying on legislative history.129 Specifically, Justice Scalia
wrote that words said in a Committee Report could cause “a criminal law
to be stricter than the text of the law displays.”130 Justice Thomas wrote
that statutes are law, but “here is a rule that would also require
knowledge of committee reports and floor statements which are not
law…[T]here appears scant justification for extending the ‘necessary
fiction’ that citizens know the law, …to such extralegal material.”131
A fourth reason why textualism is preferable to intentionalism is
because legislative history might be inaccessible to pro se litigants or
sole practitioners.132 Instead, when the text is clear, judges should not
“be free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent” based on
legislative history carefully selected from massive electronic data
bases.133 Indeed, D.C. Circuit Court Judge Harold Leventhal likened the
use of legislative history in statutory interpretation cases to “‘looking
over a crowd and picking out your friends.’”134

129
United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 310–11 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (Thomas, J., concurring).
130
Id. at 308 (Scalia, J., concurring). (“Happily for this defendant, the
plurality’s extratextual inquiry is benign: It uncovers evidence that the ‘better
understood’ reading of § 5037 is the more lenient one . . . . But this methodology
contemplates as well a different ending, one in which something said in a Committee
Report causes a criminal law to be stricter than the text of the law displays.”)
(emphasis in the original).
131
Id. at 311–12 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
132
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distilling Corp. 341 U.S. 384, 397 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“the materials of legislative history are not available to the
lawyer who can neither afford the cost of acquisition…or the cost of repeatedly
examining the whole [C]ongressional history.”). In 2020, the problem of obtaining
access to electronic research sources which contain legislative history, can be
demonstrated by the fact that e.g., the Los Angeles County Law Library restricts a
person’s free access to electronic research to two hours a day. Telephone Interview
with Los Angeles County Law Library Librarian (July 15, 2020).
133
INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
134
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 n.143 (1983). Judge Wald
served with Judge Leventhal on the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 214.
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IV. ELEVEN REASONS WHY TEXTUALISM IS PREFERABLE TO LEGAL
PRAGMATISM
There are also a number of reasons why textualism is preferable to
legal pragmatism: (a) legal pragmatism is undemocratic; (b) pragmatic
decision-making resembles legislation rather than adjudication; (c)
pragmatic federal judges improperly assume the role of common law
judges; (d) pragmatic decision-making by federal judges tempts
politicians to avoid making controversial policy decisions themselves; (e)
pragmatists believe that federal judges have the power to “update”
federal statutes; (f) textualism is based on law that is pre-existing and
provides fair notice; (g) textualists generally favor precedent; (h)
textualist decision-making is based on “law”; (i) textualists favor
constraint; (j) the foundation of pragmatism lies in a philosophy of
relativism, which is egocentric and unpredictable; and (k) the roots of
pragmatism also lie in a philosophy of realism which regards law as an
instrumental means to an end. Each of these reasons will be discussed
below.
A. Pragmatism is Undemocratic
The first reason textualism is preferable to pragmatism is because
pragmatism is undemocratic. Pragmatism is undemocratic is because it
allows federal judges – who are insulated from politics – to make
political decisions.135 Federal judges are not elected; they are appointed
for life and enjoy salary protection.136 In fact, isolating federal judges
from politics is the reason for these protections.137 This is in contrast to
members of Congress who are elected precisely because of their support
for, or against, various political issues.138 This means that it is Congress
135
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at
xxii (“the more the interpretive process strays outside a law’s text, the greater the
interpreter’s discretion.”); and id. at xxii–xxiii (“Democratic choice under the
constitutional plan depends on interpretative methods that curtail judicial
discretion.”) (emphasis added).
136
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
137
Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional
and Practical Advantages of the State Forum Over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort
Cases, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215, 228 (1994); see also Diarmuid F. O’
Scannlain, Politicians in Robes: The Separation of Powers and the Problem of
Judicial Legislation, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 31, 37 (2017) [hereinafter
O’Scannlain, Politicians] (salary protection and life tenure are designed to protect
judges “from external influences. The judiciary…is specifically designed to be
nonresponsive to political pressures; thus it should not be charged with effectuating
broad-based policy changes.”) (emphasis added).
138
Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: Public Policy Without Public Politics? 28
VAL. U. L. REV. 821, 834 (1994).
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that has the mandate for any political judgments it makes.139 Of the two
forms of law making (legislative and judicial), statutes enacted by
Congress have a democratic political basis, while decisions by federal
judges do not.140 When a judge makes a political policy decision which
goes outside the text of a statute, this can make a federal judge (rather
than Congress) “the real author of policy.”141 This undermines
democratic choice.142
Pragmatic decision-making is also undemocratic is because it
bypasses the deliberative political process contained in Article I, and
encroaches upon the power of Congress to make law.143 The text of a
statute which has been enacted into law is the product of a three step
procedure, involving the two elected branches of government.144 These
procedures act as a “bulwark against tyranny” and do not partake of the
“efficient” values of pragmatism.145 Instead, the cumbersome process
outlined in Article I results in “much debate and deliberation in both
Houses of Congress,”146 and it is the “precise text” agreed to by both the

139

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
140
Linde, supra note 138, at 834 (“legislating is legitimately political and
judging is not.”); see also CHARLES D. BREITEL, THE COURTS AND LAWMAKING, in
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 8 (Monrad G. Paulsen, ed. 1959)
(“Because it is dependent politically, [the legislative process] expresses…the general
will and popular needs…[judges] are more detached.”) (emphasis added).
141
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at
xxii. (To enact policy in the form of a law under the Constitution, the “legislature
acts first, the executive branch . . . second, and the judiciary third. If the final
decision-maker exercises significant discretion, then it (the judiciary) rather than the
legislator . . . is the real author of policy.” (emphasis added)).
142
Id. at xxii–xxiii (The real problem with judicially created rules involving
statutory texts “lies in the transfer of authority from elected officials to those with
life tenure.”); see also Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative
History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375–376 (1987) (Former D.C. Circuit Court Judge
Kenneth W. Starr echoed what he labeled “democratic theory concerns” when he
pointed to the “danger of introducing the voice of the federal courts – the
nonpolitical branch – into the political process of legislation.”).
143
U.S. CONST. art. I.
144
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998). The three steps are:
passage by the House of Representatives; approval by the Senate of “the same text”;
and the signing into law of the text by the President. Id. “The Constitution explicitly
requires that each of th[e] three steps be taken before a bill may ‘become a law.’” Id.
145
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965) (“separation of powers
was obviously not instituted with the idea that it would promote governmental
efficiency. It was, on the contrary, looked to as a bulwark against tyranny. For if
governmental power is fractionalized, . . . no man or group of men will be able to
impose its unchecked will.”).
146
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 447.
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Senate and House that becomes law when it is signed by the President.147
When a court adopts a method of statutory interpretation which allows it
to effectively rewrite a statute, it encroaches on the Article I power of
Congress to make law.148 Allowing a federal judge to bypass the
democratic process also invites arbitrary decision-making.149 This is
because “the judge would need only his own vote, or those of just a few
colleagues, to revise the law willy-nilly in accordance with his
preferences.”150
Finally, pragmatism is undemocratic is because pragmatism is
characterized by rule from above.
Textualism is preferable to
pragmatism because it is consistent with democratic principles of
government of rule from below, rather than rule from above. Unlike
King George III whose power was legitimized from above, the power of
a President, and the power of Congress, is legitimized from below
through popular elections.151 This is not true of federal court judges.
Unlike legislators in Congress, federal court judges are not
legitimated from below through popular elections.152 Instead, federal
judges are legitimated from above because they are appointed to life
terms by the President.153 When a federal judge decides to unilaterally
amend a federal statute under the guise of “interpreting” it, this creates a
situation in which the rule from below by the people’s representatives in
Congress is put aside in favor of rule from above by unelected federal
judges appointed for life.
B. Pragmatic Decision-making Resembles Legislation Rather than
Adjudication
As well as being undemocratic, pragmatic decision-making
resembles legislation rather than adjudication. This is another reason
why textualism is preferable to pragmatism. Although “Carl von
Clausewitz wrote that war is the continuation of politics by other means,
147

Id.
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV.
2118, 2120 (2016) [hereinafter Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory].
149
Id.
150
Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, and Judges and Legislators, and the
Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 913 (2016) [hereinafter
Gorsuch, Lions].
151
See Mario Patrono & Justin O’Frosini, Two Grand Old Ladies Face to
Face: The United Kingdom and the United States of America Constitutions
Compared, 46 VICT. U. WELLINGTON. L. REV. 989, 1008 (2015).
152
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 (declaring that the President has the power to
appoint judges) See also U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. See also supra note 142. (referring
to the danger of “federal courts – the nonpolitical branch” having a voice in the
political process.)
153
Id.
148
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… adjudication is not [supposed to be] the continuation of legislation by
other means.”154

1. Like Legislators, Pragmatic Judges Rely on Forward-Looking
“Legislative Facts” to Create New Law and Policy for the Public
Pragmatists have characterized the traditional legal process as
backward-looking.155 This is in contrast to pragmatism, which they
describe as a “forward-looking” policy-oriented approach.156
Pragmatism’s forward-looking approach highlights an important
distinction between legislative and judicial action, in general, and
between pragmatism and textualism, in particular. This is the distinction
between legislative facts and adjudicative facts. In their decisionmaking, textualists focus on past facts involving the immediate parties
before the court.157 These are adjudicative facts. Pragmatists, on the
other hand, often focus on future consequences for the public.158 These
are not adjudicative facts; they are legislative facts. Legislative facts are
different from adjudicative facts:
Adjudicative facts are facts about the parties…who did what, where,
when…Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties
but [similar to legislation itself] are general facts which help the
tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.159

154

Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., 679 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 2012).
POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 76, at 453 (A pragmatist judge is
“forward-looking where the neotraditionalist is back-ward looking. . . . The
pragmatist will also be less ‘professional’ more policy-orientated . . . less the
traditional legalist.”).
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 82–83 (2012)
(“Pragmatic judges . . . focus on the future . . . [and] consider overall consequences,
not just those falling on the litigants . . . [what binds] are outcomes that would create
the greatest public good.”); see also Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus
Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 738 (2002) (a
pragmatist wants to produce “better social consequences”)(emphasis added)
[hereinafter Posner, Pragmatism Versus].
159
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 135 (2nd
ed. 1975). Professor Davis developed these distinctions in an administrative law
context. Id. Articulation of the distinction between legislative action and judicial
action became necessary because significant consequences (such as the right to
procedural due process), could result from whether the action an agency took was
characterized as adjudicative or legislative. See, e.g., the classic early cases of
Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (local agency), and Bi Metallic
Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (state agency).
155
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In other words, adjudicative facts (e.g., Bob hit Sam’s car on May 1,
2020) are facts that have already taken place;160 legislative facts are
prospective facts that policymaking legislators generally consider.161 An
example of a legislative fact is evidence showing that “the death penalty
does not deter crime,” which is presented to convince a court to adopt a
policy striking down the death penalty.162 As the example above shows,
a legislative fact is a prospective fact. Significantly, legislative facts do
not assume the existence of any pre-existing law.163 This is because
legislative facts “are used to create law.”164
When pragmatic judges make decisions based not on adjudicative
facts related to the parties, but on general legislative facts affecting the
public (along with a judge’s well-meaning idea of what the law should
be), they assume a legislative role. Great scholarly pragmatic jurists like
Judge Richard A. Posner confirm this.165 He writes that in cases where
“the orthodox materials do not yield an answer to the legal question
presented, or if the answer they yield is unsatisfactory, the judge’s role is
legislative: to create new law that decides cases and governs similar
future ones.”166 This suggests that the goal of some pragmatic jurists is
160

Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts,
41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 113 (1988).
161
Id. at 114; see also FED. R. EVID. 201(a) (treating legislative facts
differently from adjudicative facts). Specifically, FED. R. EVID. 201(a) provides that
judicial notice shall be taken of “an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact.” Id.
This is because (as the advisory committee notes attached to the statute explain), the
method of establishing an adjudicative fact is different from the method of
establishing a legislative fact:
The usual method of establishing adjudicative facts is through the
introduction of evidence [and] . . . a high degree of indisputability is the
essential prerequisite. Legislative facts are quite different . . . .
[Legislative facts are facts that judges] believe as distinguished from
[adjudicative] facts which are clearly . . . within the domain of the
indisputable.
FED. R. EVID. 201(a) 1969 advisory committee notes (emphasis added).
162

Woolhandler, supra note 160, at 114.
Id.
164
Id.
165
Posner, Self-Restraint, supra note 78, at 540.
166
Id. The words “or if the answer they yield is unsatisfactory” have been
emphasized to bring attention to the broad scope of the legislative role that
pragmatic jurists think they should play. Id. Apparently, Judge Posner believes that
judges should legislate, not only in those situations where orthodox materials do not
provide an answer, but also if the answer is “unsatisfactory.” Id. The obvious
question this raises is, unsatisfactory to who? It appears to be the judge presiding
over the case. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 30 (2017)
163
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to create law, rather than apply it. In a system of separation of powers,
judges are not supposed to legislate by looking forward to change the law
as they want it to be for the future.167 Instead, textualists believe that
judges should apply existing law as it is.168

2. Like Legislators, Pragmatic Judges Rely on “Balancing”
Another reason pragmatic decision-making resembles legislation is
because, like legislators, pragmatic judges rely on “balancing” as a
method of decision-making.169 Under a balancing approach, the
“correct” decision is one that provides the greatest benefit.170 Judges
who use a balancing test to decide cases eschew formal legal rules and
decide cases instead on the basis of the competing interests of the parties,
or “the competing interests of society more generally.”171 The words
“interests of society” have been emphasized to bring attention to the fact
that any judge who decides to engage in balancing, or weighing the
interests of society, “performs essentially the function of a legislator, and
in a real sense makes law.”172
A federal judge’s reliance on “balancing” as a method of decisionmaking presents four problems. The most obvious problem is separation
of powers.173 Generally, if a decision “involves a host of considerations

(“the judicial role is to a considerable extent legislative…”); See also, Richard A.
Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in Federal Courts-One Judge’s
Views, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 3, 11–12 (2013) (“I have been criticized for including in my
opinions facts drawn from Web research conducted by me . . . Besides adjudicative
facts . . . There are also legislative facts which are facts that bear on the design or
interpretation of legal doctrines.”).
167
Gorsuch, Lions, supra note 150, at 906.
168
Id.
169
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in an Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 958 (1987) (“While a pragmatic instrumental view of law does not compel
a balancing approach, balancing was certainly a logical doctrinal application of the
new jurisprudence. Balancing openly embraced the view of the law as purposeful, as
a means to an end . . . .”) [hereinafter, Aleinikoff, Balancing].
170
Id. at 943.
171
Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 586 (1988)
(emphasis added).
172
Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV.
4, 20 (1936); see also Aleinikoff, Balancing, supra note 169, at 957–58. (“If the
value of a legal rule was established by its consequences, . . . Where did the new
[pragmatic consequentialist] legal philosophy leave judges? Certainly, they were far
less constrained by legal doctrine than had been previously thought . . . most
scholars recognized that, in the new jurisprudential world, not a great deal
separated the judge and the legislator.”).
173
Aleinikoff, Balancing, supra note 169, at 984. (a cost benefit “methodology
may be an appropriate model for common law adjudication. But balancing needs to
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that must be weighed,” such a decision should be made by Congress, not
the courts.174
A second problem with balancing is indeterminacy.175 When a
judge takes on the role of a “pragmatic social-welfare maximizer” by
weighing costs and benefits involving possible outcomes of a case, this
presents a problem of indeterminacy.176 This is because pragmatic
balancing offers no way to determine which values or benefits should be
preferred.177
A third problem with relying on balancing as a tool of statutory
interpretation is that it opens the door to arbitrary decision-making.178
Professor Martin Shapiro believes that “the only clear things about
balancing are the techniques for putting the judicial thumb on the
scale.”179 Similarly, Professor John F. Manning concluded that balancing
tests allow judges “to come out either way in any given case.”180

be defended in constitutional interpretation where the decision of a court supplants a
legislative decision.”)
174
U.S. v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 512–13 (1954) (“the claim now asserted, . . .
presents a question of policy on which Congress has not spoken. The selection of
that policy is most advantageous to the whole involves a host of considerations that
must be weighed and appraised. That function is more appropriately for those who
write the laws, rather than those who interpret them.” (emphasis added)); see also
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (in
the context of recognizing a qualified immunity defense, which would necessarily
involve the balancing of competing values, Justice Thomas declared that the
“Constitution assigns this kind of balancing to Congress, not the Courts.” (emphasis
added)).
175
Aleinikoff, Balancing, supra note 169, at 963.
176
Gorsuch, Lions, supra note 150, at 918.
177
Id.; see also Manning, Judicial Restraint, supra note 98, at 754 (“balancing
tests asked the Court to compare incommensurable values or make sense of multiple
unweighted and unranked factors.”) (emphasis added); see also Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part) ([Where the] “interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like
judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”).
178
Aleinikoff, Balancing, supra note 175, note 169, at 973. See also Wooden
v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1080 (2022) (Gorsuch, J. concurring, in part)
(discussing the “Court’s [new] multi-factor balancing test…under the Occasions
Clause [of a penalty enhancing criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(1)]” id. Justice
Gorsuch noted that lower courts have already looked to the same balancing factors,
and that this has “yielded a grave problem: Some individuals face mandatory 15 year
prison terms while [others]…do not— with the results depending on little more than
how much weight this or that judge chooses to assign this or that factor.” Id. at 1080
(emphasis added).
179
MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 83 (1966).
180
Manning, Judicial Restraint, supra note 98, at 754–55 (citing Rutan v.
Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 96 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
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A fourth problem with balancing arises from the fact that when a
judge decides to make a decision by balancing various factors (and
essentially take on a legislative role), then any explanation for the court’s
decision need not meet the high doctrinal standards of adjudication.181
Why is this important? When an appellate court fails to provide
doctrinal support for its decision, it fails to provide rules for lower courts
(thereby limiting the case’s precedential value) and removes a constraint
on judicial discretion.
Textualist Justice Scalia referred to the
importance of providing doctrinal support when he explained how he set
about writing a majority opinion for the Court.182 He stated that he
begins by saying, “This is the basis of our decision.”183 He explained
that he does this, “not only to constrain lower courts,” but to “constrain
myself as well.”184
Significantly, Justice Scalia compared his method of decisionmaking to judges who announce that, “‘on balance’ we think the law was
violated here—leaving ourselves free to say in the next case that, ‘on
balance’ it was not… .”185 While it may be tempting for a judge to rely
on balancing as a method of decision-making , since this allows a judge
more flexibility, Justice Thomas believes that this is not the best
approach for an appellate court.186 Instead, courts should adopt “brightline rules” which provide notice and limit “the ability of judges in the
future to alter the law to fit their policy preferences.”187

a multipart balancing test leads to results “favored by the personal (and necessarily
shifting) philosophical dispositions of a majority of this Court.”)).
181
POPKIN, supra note 9, at 212 (“ordinary judging avoids . . . lapsing into a
descriptive pragmatism that gives up all attempts to justify judicial discretion in
statutory interpretation.”); see also Linde, supra note 138, at 833 (“Because a court
adjudicates, its explanations must meet higher standards of cogency and accuracy
than a legislature’s . . . Statutes may rest on uncertain knowledge and erroneous
predictions.”); see also Melvin I. Urofsky, William O. Douglas As a Common Law
Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133, 138 (1991) (Discussing the problem which arises from
judges who regard political ideology as “the most important factor” in their decisionmaking and become “uninterested in the doctrinal support” for their opinions.).
182
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1179 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule of Law].
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 1179–80.
186
Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) [hereinafter
Thomas, Judging].
187
Id.
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C. Pragmatic Judges Improperly Assume the Role of Common Law
Judges
In addition to balancing, Fourth Circuit Court Judge J. Harvie
Wilkinson has pointed to the fact that some pragmatic judges do what
“their common law ancestors did” and make policy.188 This highlights
another reason why textualism is preferable to pragmatism: federal
judges should not assume the role of common law judges. To understand
this problem with legal pragmatism, it is important to note that, in
addition to constitutional law, there are two primary sources of law in the
United States: statutory law and common law.189 Statutory law is created
by legislatures. Common law, also referred to as “judge made law,” is
created by judges and developed through judicial decisions.190
There are four reasons why a federal judge should not assume the
role of a common law judge and make new law and policy. First, federal
courts are not common law courts, and have not been vested with a state
common law court’s “open-ended lawmaking powers.”191 Instead,
federal courts are courts of only limited jurisdiction;192 they are “not
general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to
develop and apply their own rules of decision.”193

188

WILKINSON, supra note 158, at 88.
The word “primary” is used to bring attention to the fact that other sources
of law exist in the United States, such as the continental civil law system of
community property brought to the United States from Spain and France, and found
in ten states. Caroline Bermeo Newcombe, The Origin and Civil Law Foundation of
the Community Property System, Why California Adopted It and Why Community
Property Principles Benefit Women, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER &
CLASS 1, 2 n.3 (2011).
190
Woodman v. Kera LLC, 785 N.W.2d 1, 21 (Mich. 2010).
191
Nw. Airlines, Inc., v. Transp. Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981).
192
Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, with the ability to hear only the cases
entrusted to them by a grant of power contained in either the Constitution or an act
of Congress.”).
193
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (emphasis added); see
also, Nestle USA, Inc., v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1938 (2021) (“Because Erie denied
the existence of a federal common law, ‘a federal court’s authority to recognize a
damages remedy must rest at bottom on a statute enacted by Congress.’”). The Court
added that:
“Of course, courts at common law may have enjoyed the power to
create …causes of action. But the power to create a cause of action is in
every meaningful sense the power to enact a new law that assigns new
rights and new legally enforceable duties. And our Constitution generally
assigns that power to Congress. A self-governing people depends on
elected representatives—not judges—to make its laws.”
Id. at 1942 (emphasis in the original).
189
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Second, not only are federal courts not common law courts, “there
is ‘no federal general common law.’”194 The era of federal general
common law was supposed to end after the Court’s decision in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins.195 Legal pragmatism appears to harken back to
the pre-Erie freewheeling era of Swift v. Tyson when civil (but not
criminal) general federal common law was alive and well. 196 About this
era, one justice wrote: “I am aware that what has been termed the general
law of the country—which is often little less than what the judge
advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should be the general law on a
particular subject.”197
However, although federal judges do not have the power to
formulate federal general common law, they do have the authority, in
certain discrete areas, to develop what has come to be known as “federal
common law.”198 Specifically, the Supreme Court has recognized that
certain “limited areas exist in which federal judges may appropriately
craft the rule of decision. . . .”199 It is in unique areas, such as
admiralty,200 interstate water disputes,201 Bivens Actions,202 and antitrust
194

Rodriguez v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 140 S. Ct. 713, 717 (2020) (quoting
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
195
Id.
196
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842); see also KERMIT L. HALL, ET. AL,
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 166 (2011).
197
Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
198
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981);
see also Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 421 (2011) (referring to
the distinction “between ‘general common law’ and ‘specialized federal common
law’” which emerged after Erie (emphasis added)).
199
Rodriguez, 140 S. Ct. at 717 (citation omitted). The following examples are
not an exhaustive list.
200
Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 203 (2019) (“When a
federal court decides a maritime case, it acts as a federal “common law court,” much
as state courts do in state common-law cases.”). The source of a federal judge’s
ability to develop a common law of admiralty is found in the Constitution, U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, c. 1, and the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (1789)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
201
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938) (“[W]hether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between
the two States is a question of ‘federal common law’. . . .”).
202
Bivens actions are federal common law actions based directly on the
Constitution. Stuart v. Rech, 603 F.3d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Livingood
v. Townsend, 422 F. Supp. 24, 27 (D. Minn. 1976) (“[T]he Supreme Court created a
new constitutional tort in Bivens, which has been characterized as a new form of
federal ‘common law’ . . . .”). Bivens actions originated in 1971 when the Court
recognized a private right of action for damages against federal officials (based
directly on the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution) in a case titled Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

31

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [], Art. 7

170

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

law that a federal judge can legitimately assume the role of a common
law judge and engage in common law lawmaking.203
The third reason why a federal judge should not assume the role of a
common law judge is because – unlike state court judges – federal judges
do not ordinarily have the power to make policy. While state common
law judges can make new law on public policy grounds,204 textualist
Justice Thomas reminds us that “this emphatically is not the mission of
the federal courts.”205 Federal judges should not decide policy;206
instead, they should “apply authoritative texts—authoritative because
they are issued by democratically elected and accountable bodies—to the
facts of specific cases.”207
203

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899
(2007) (“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a commonlaw statute . . . . ‘In antitrust, the federal courts . . . act more as common-law courts
than in other areas governed by federal statute.’”) (quotation omitted). Another
source of statutory based federal common law is the Federal Employers Liability Act
(“FELA”), Pub. L. 60-100, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§
51–60). See Schadel v. Iowa Interstate R.R., Ltd., 381 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“[F]ederal law must set the terms of a railroad employee’s right to recover against
her employer for negligence. . . . Since the time of the FELA’s enactment in 1908,
the Court has ‘develop[ed] a federal common law of negligence under the FELA . . .
.’”) (citation omitted); see also Dominic G. Biffignani, Pomegranates and
Railroads: Why POM Wonderful Suggests that the Federal Railroad Safety Act
Should Never Preclude Federal Employers Liability Act Claims, 86 MO. L. REV.
903, 905–06 (2021) (“Though FELA is a federal statute, its cause of action sounds in
the theory of common-law negligence.”).
204
Farber, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 42, at 283 (state common law
court judges can create new law and doctrines “embodying their own views of public
policy.”) For example, when the new doctrine of strict liability was first announced
by the California Supreme Court, it was created by state common law judges. See
Carlin v. Super. Ct., 920 P.2d 1347, 1349 (Cal. 1996) (“[U]nder our [California]
doctrine of strict liability first announced in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
. . .” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also Isaac Montal, The Consumer
Expectations Test in New Jersey: What Can Consumers Expect Now?, 54 BROOK. L.
REV. 1381, 1384 (1989) (California common law state courts “have been in the
forefront in developing the common law of strict products liability. Greenman . . .
was the first case to impose strict liability upon a manufacturer . . . . [It] represents
the beginning of a ‘new era’”) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
205
Thomas, Judging, supra note 186, at 5 (emphasis added).
206
Id. Instead of making law and deciding policy, the “duty of the federal
courts is to interpret and enforce two bodies of positive law: the Constitution and . . .
federal statutory law.” Id. Positive law (which consists of positive enactments by
legislatures, or regulations created agencies), is distinct from judge made common
law. See, e.g., Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, a Div. of Brunswick Corp., 537 U.S.
51, 69 (2002) (a statute’s preemption clause might occupy the field of “state positive
laws and regulations but . . . does not cover common-law claims.”).
207
Thomas, Judging, supra note 186, at 5; see also Nw. Airlines, Inc. v.
Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (“[T]he federal lawmaking
power is vested in the legislative not the judicial branch of government.”).
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The modest role that federal courts are supposed to play in
developing federal common law was emphasized by a warning to federal
judges in a unanimous 2020 Supreme Court opinion.208 In Rodriguez v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Co.,209 which involved a dispute between a
bank in receivership and its bankrupt corporate partner over a tax refund,
the Court found that no unique federal interest was involved since the
case did not involve how the federal government receives taxes, and that
“[j]udicial lawmaking in the form of federal common law plays a
necessarily modest role under a Constitution which vests the federal
government’s ‘legislative powers’ in Congress . . . .”210 Lest there be any
mistake about why the Court decided to take the Rodriguez case and the
message it wanted to convey, the Court declared, “[W]e took this case
only to underscore the care federal courts should exercise before taking
up the invitation to try their hand at common lawmaking.”211
Finally, about the common law mindset of some federal judges,
textualist Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that a common law judge plays
“king devising—out of the brilliance of one’s own mind, those laws that
ought to govern mankind.”212 While some might suggest that “playing
king” may be appropriate for state court common law judges, it is not
appropriate for federal court judges with no electoral mandate and only
limited judicial power.
The fourth reason why a federal judge should not take on the role
of a common law judge is because, under a system of separation of
powers,213 federal courts are not supposed to exercise legislative power
208

Rodriguez v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 140 S. Ct. 713, 718 (2020).
Id.
210
Id. at 717.
211
Id. at 718. The Court also stated that “before federal judges may claim a
new area for common lawmaking strict conditions must be satisfied” such as
showing that new lawmaking is “‘necessary to protect uniquely federal interest.’” Id.
at 717 (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640
(1981)).
212
SCALIA, supra note 4, at 7; see also Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 182, at
1178 (“The common law, discretion-conferring approach is ill suited, moreover, to a
legal system in which the supreme court can review only an insignificant proportion
of decided cases.”) (emphasis added).
213
The Supreme Court’s concern about separation of powers in statutory
interpretation cases was emphasized in Nestle USA, Inc., v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931
(2021). Plaintiffs (who claimed that they were trafficked from Mali to work on farms
in Ivory Coast) filed a complaint under the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350)
(“ATS”), despite the fact that the statute contained no private right of action. In
dismissing the complaint, the Court stressed that: “judicial creation of a cause of
action is an extraordinary act that places great stress on the separation of powers.
Although this Court in the mid-twentieth century often assumed authority to create
causes of action . . . ‘[i]n later years, we came to appreciate more fully the tension
between this practice and the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial
power’. . . .” (emphasis added) Id. at 1935, 1938.
209
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unless Congress has delegated that power.214 Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act (which contains a broad congressional statutory prohibition
against combinations “in restraint of trade”)215 is an example of
congressionally delegated lawmaking power.216 Similarly, a section of
the Consumer Product Safety Act (which provides recovery for
“reasonable” attorney fees if “the court determines it to be in the interest
of justice”)217 has been described as “less a matter of pure interpretation
than of common law-like judging.”218
D. Pragmatic Decisions Tempt Legislators to Avoid Making
Controversial Political Choices Themselves
Another reason why textualism is preferable to pragmatism is
because pragmatic decision-making by federal judges tempts politicians
to avoid making controversial political choices themselves. Members of
Congress are often reluctant to take a position on hot-button issues
because they are afraid of not getting re-elected.219 The result is that
some policy choices are passed on to pragmatic federal judges (who may
share the same important policy goals as the plaintiffs), and therefore

214

Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the
Interpretive Process: An ‘Institutionalist’ Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 790
n.115 (1989) (“The Supreme Court should not be able to construe a statute to
delegate common law-like power to the federal judiciary, without first carefully
examining the statute in question to determine that Congress so intended, lest the
court effectively usurp legislative power.”); see also Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (“[U]nless the statute plainly hands
courts the power to create and revise a form of common law, the domain of the
statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved
by the legislative process. . . . [T]he court [should] hold the matter . . . outside the
statute’s domain.” (emphasis added)).
215
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
216
Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 705, 706 (1982) (“The Sherman and Clayton Acts authorized the Supreme
Court to invent and enforce a law of restraint of trade in the common law fashion.”
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)); see also CROSS, supra note 47, at 15 (The
Sherman Act “appears to be a broad delegation of discretionary authority to the
judiciary. . . . In applying the law’s vague language, judges have typically evaluated
a number of policy concerns . . . . This plainly seems to be the creation of a
lawmaking partnership with the judiciary.”) (emphasis added).
217
15 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
218
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory, supra note 148, at 2120 n.12.
219
See, e.g., Susan Ferrechio, Most Democrats Vote “Present” on Green New
Deal,
WASHINGTON
EXAMINER
(Mar.
26,
2019,
4:52
PM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tag/alexandria-ocasiocortez?source=%2Fnews%2Fcongress%2Fmost-democrats-vote-present-on-greennew-deal [https://perma.cc/UZM7-99VY] (noting that some Senators simply voted
“present” on a resolution involving the important Green New Deal).
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choose to engage in “creative” decision-making.220 For example, in
Juliana v. United States,221 a creative Oregon district court judge held
that twenty-one young plaintiffs had a fundamental constitutional right to
a “climate system capable of sustaining human life.”222 In making her
decision, the judge articulated an expansive pragmatic view of public
trust assets223 which consist of certain natural resources held in trust for
the public.224 Juliana was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where the case
was dismissed on standing grounds.225
Unfortunately, when a well-meaning pragmatic federal judge
decides an important public policy issue, this weakens both the judicial
and legislative branches of government. First, when a federal judge
accepts an invitation to engage in judicial policy making, this results in
“‘a lessening…of legislative responsibility.’”226 This weakens the
legislative branch. Specifically, pragmatic judicial policy making allows
Congress to “shirk its constitutional duties” to make new law or change
old law.227
Second, when federal judges stay within their constitutional role
and refrain from policy making, this “enhances democracy” since it puts
Posner, Offer Law, supra note 77, at 1660 (statutory “interpretation is a
creative rather than contemplative task” (emphasis added)); see also, John W.
Poulos, The Judicial Philosophy of Roger Traynor, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 1643, 1696
(1995) (Pragmatism “asks whether existing law produces its desired goal. When
these elements are employed, judges are usually contemplating the exercise of their
creative powers.” (emphasis added).
221
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947
F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
222
Id. at 1250.
223
Id. at 1255 n.10 (declaring that the public trust doctrine should be “extended
to meet changing conditions and needs of the public . . . . The Supreme Court
arguably endorsed this pragmatic approach to the identification of trust assets.”)
(emphasis added), (quotation omitted.)
224
See, e.g., Mineral City v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 900 F.3d 1027,
1030 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Under the public trust doctrine, states hold navigable
waterways within their borders in trust for the good of the public.).
225
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020).
226
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 4 (quoting JOHN M. HARLAN, THE
EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE
JOHN M. HARLAN 291 (1969)).
227
Robert J. Pushaw, Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking
the Supreme Court’s Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 51 GA. L. REV. 121, 132
n. 49 (2016); see also Justice Robert P. Young, Jr., A Judicial Traditionalist
Confronts Justice Brennan’s School of Judicial Philosophy, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 263, 284 (2008) (“political activists…have been guilty of resorting to the
courts as a means of circumventing the majoritarian political process…Our judicial
system, influenced by the Brennan [pragmatist school]…of judicial philosophy has
encouraged the expectation that the courts will assume the constitutional role of the
legislature.”).
220
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pressure “on the democratically elected body of the legislature to resist
the urge to hand the difficult decisions over to the life-tenured, unelected
members of the federal judiciary.”228
Third, when important political issues are repeatedly brought into
federal courts (by e.g., politically sympathetic young plaintiffs)229 this
weakens the judicial branch as an institution. Judges are no longer
perceived by the public as applying of the law, but rather as its politically
motivated creators. In fact, one commentator concluded that the Juliana
climate change case is part of a “political moment, in which advocates
are engaging in direct action and creative litigation. . . .”230
E. Pragmatic Judges Believe that they Should “Update” Federal Statutes
Some pragmatic judges believe that they should take on the role of
sharing the legislative “burden” and update old statutes.231 Textualist
judges do not.232 They believe that it is not the role of federal judges to
update statutes to make them “better”; this would give judges too much
power to make law.233 Instead, any changes to a statute to “suit present
day tastes” should be made by Congress.234
228

Walker, Judicial Tendencies, supra note 119, at 220 (discussing the
argument that “judges help legislators do their constitutionally charged tasks better
when judges refuse to engage in judicial lawmaking in the guise of statutory
interpretation. . . . This in turn enhances democracy by putting the onus on the
democratically elected body of the legislature to make hard policy choices and resist
the urge to hand the difficult decisions over to the life-tenured, unelected members
of the federal judiciary.”) (emphasis added).
229
See Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 12 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 561 F.
App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Similar to the plaintiffs in Juliana, plaintiffs in the
Jackson case were politically sympathetic “young citizens.” Id. at 12. They sued
various agencies and officers of the federal government “to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.” Id.
230
Nathaniel Levy, Juliana and the Political Generativity of Climate
Litigation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 479, 506 (2019); see also Young, supra note 227, at
283 (discussing use of the judiciary as “an alternate forum to achieve political ends”)
231
See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech. Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 357 (en
banc) (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner, J., concurring). In Hively, the court expanded the
scope of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include two additional classes
of potential plaintiffs. Id. at 351. Pragmatic Judge Richard A. Posner wrote a
concurrence in which he appeared to suggest that what he and the other judges did in
Hively was legislate (by sharing the legislative “burden” and “imposing” a new
meaning on an old 1964 statute), and that the court should embrace what they did by
“openly” acknowledging it. Id. at 357 (Posner, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
232
SCALIA, supra note 4, at 22.
233
Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., 679 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 2012).
234
Nat’l Broiler Mktg. Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 827 (1978)
(“Petitioner suggests that agriculture has changed since 1922 when the Act was
passed . . . . We may accept the proposition that agriculture has changed . . . [but] a
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1. Statutory Law Should be Developed by the Political Branches
Even when it is apparent that a federal statute is in need of repair,
textualists believe that it is the job of the political branches to make the
repair, not federal judges.235 This is because the systematic development
of statutory law should be “accomplished democratically” through the
constitutionally mandated procedures contained in Article I.236 In
addition, since statutes are laws enacted by Congress, any alterations
should be made by “the same body.”237
When federal judges unilaterally amend statutes, they effectively
transform democratically enacted texts into “mere springboards for
judicial lawmaking.”238 This diminishes statutes because (under a
pragmatic approach) a statute is not “the” law, but rather a springboard
for new law which a pragmatic federal judge feels might be better.239
Not only does this diminish the legislative role of Congress, it also
allows judges to become “secret legislators, declaring not what the law is
but what they would like it to be.”240

2. “Updating” a Federal Statute is a Form of Judicial Legislation and
Federal Judges Should Not Engage in Judicial Legislation
When a federal judge takes on the role of substantively “updating” a
federal statute, this is a form of judicial legislation. The term “judicial
legislation” has a variety of definitions. One Ninth Circuit judge defines
statute ‘is not an empty vessel into which this Court is free to pour a vintage that we
think better suits present-day tastes.’ Considerations of this kind are for the Congress
not the courts.” ) (quoting United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297 (1970).
235
Livingston Rebuild Ctr., Inc. v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 970 F.2d 295, 298–99 (7th
Cir. 1992) (“The Railroad Retirement Act is a creaky statute . . . . But reconciling the
statute with current forms of corporate organization . . . is a job for the political
branches.”); see also Soppet, 679 F.3d at 642 (“Nor should a court try to keep a
statute up to date. Legislation means today what it meant when enacted.”).
236
Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
237
United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 702 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“There is no justification for this Court to read exemptions into the [Tort Claims]
Act . . . . If the Act is to be altered that is a function for the same body that adopted
it.”).
238
SCALIA, supra note 4, at 25.
239
Id.
240
See, e.g., Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 10, at 67. Then-Judge
Gorsuch testified that “it is for this body, the people’s representative to make new
laws . . . and for neutral independent judges to apply the law . . . . If judges were just
secret legislators, declaring not what the law is but what they would like it to be, the
very idea of government by the people and for the people would be at risk.” Id. at
66–67 (emphasis added).
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it as “the phenomenon of judges displacing democratic policy choices in
the name of their own policy preferences.”241 A law professor uses the
term judicial legislation to describe what happens when a common law
court, or federal agency “wrestles with a question of law or policy” and
acts legislatively. 242 The problem with federal judges engaging in
judicial legislation is that federal courts are not common law courts, and
Article III judges are different from most Article II federal agency heads.
This is because federal agency heads have been delegated legislative
power by Congress243 and can be removed by a politically accountable
President. 244 This is not true of federal court judges.

3. Federal Judges Should Not Make Policy
A federal judge’s decision to effectively amend a federal statute
under the fiction of statutory interpretation, makes policy.245 There are
three problems with federal judges making policy. First, policy is “not
the natural province of courts.”246 Courts are the only non-elected branch
O’Scannlain, Politicians, supra note 137, at 33 n.8.
Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942) (“When an agency
wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting legislatively, just as judges have
created the common law through judicial legislation . . . .”)(emphasis added).
243
WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 546
(5th ed. 2014) (“Delegation of legislative power . . . . The Constitution authorizes the
delegation of rulemaking to agencies because Congress is given the power ‘[t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to carry out its functions under
Article I.”); see, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir.
2016) (referring to “an executive agency, exercising delegated legislative authority”)
(emphasis in original).
244
Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON
REG. 283, 312 (1986) (“Chevron shifts power from the courts to the agencies . . .
[T]he decision returns the power to set policy to democratically accountable
[agency] officials . . . .” (emphasis added) [hereinafter Starr, Judicial Review]
Federal agency officials are democratically accountable, at least in theory,
because the agencies themselves were created by Congress, and most agency heads
can be removed by the President. See infra note 246 referring to executive and
legislative oversight.
245
Frank H. Easterbrook, Second Annual Henry Lecture: Judicial Discretion
in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004) (“When judges make policy
— which is, after all, what discretion in statutory interpretation means — you can’t
get rid of them. In a representative democracy, that is a powerful reason not to allow
judges to make policy in the first place.” (emphasis added)) [hereinafter Easterbrook,
Judicial Discretion].
246
Starr, Judicial Review, supra note 244, at 312 (“Policy, which is not the
natural province of courts, belongs properly to the administrative agencies, and
ultimately, to the executive and legislature that oversee them.” (emphasis added));
see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 206–07 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting) (where a judgment “depends ultimately on the values and
241
242
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of government, and the constitution has not authorized courts to exercise
legislative power.247 Second, unlike state court judges, members of
Congress, or most Article II agency department heads, you can’t “get rid
of” federal judges if you don’t like their policies.248 This is a reason why
judges should “not make policy in the first place.”249
A third reason federal court judges should not make policy is
because judicial discretion is supposed to be more limited than political
discretion.250 Specifically, while “[l]egal discretion is limited…Political
discretion has a far wider range.”251 Any legal discretion that a federal
judge enjoys is supposed to be constrained by law.252 According to one
court:
perspective of the decision maker. . . . judgments of [this] sort . . . are beyond the
institutional competence and constitutional authority of the judiciary. They are
preeminently matters for legislative discretion, with judicial review, if it exists at all,
narrowly limited.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
247
Pushaw, supra note 227, at 131 (“[T]he Constitution . . . created a
democracy based upon the separation-of-powers premise that electorally responsible
representatives make policy through legislation . . . Article I authorizes Congress to
exercise ‘legislative power’ . . . Significantly, Article I excludes courts from the
legislative process.”) (emphasis added); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism
and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (1998) (“the judicial branch
serves best by enforcing enacted words rather than unenacted (more likely,
imagined) intents, purposes, and wills. An interpreter who bypasses or downplays
the text becomes a lawmaker without obeying the constitutional rules for making
law.”)(parenthesis in original).[hereinafter Easterbrook, Dead Hand].
248
Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion, supra note 245, at 9–10 (explaining that
the reason you can’t get rid of federal judges is because they have tenure, and tenure
has a “dark side” in that it can allow judges “to be more faithful to their own
views.”). Of course, a federal judge can be removed through the impeachment
process contained in Article I of the Constitution; but it would be difficult to imagine
that this rarely used procedure is available for policy disputes.
249
Id. at 9.
250
United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas, 614, 620 (D. Mass. 1808).
251
Id.
252
Id. The federal judge in the Willliam case explained that legal discretion is
“defined by Lord Coke [as] ‘Discretio est discerne, per legem, quid sit justum.’” Id.
at 620. Lord Coke’s sentence (in Latin) about legal discretion has been interpreted
by the Supreme Court of Virginia to mean that legal discretion is not an unlimited
arbitrary power; instead it is
‘discretion guided by law [per legem]. It must be governed by rule: it
must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular.’ . . . It is
not an unlimited power . . . . Harris v. Harris, 31 Va. (1 Gratt.) 13, 16
(1878) (emphasis in original).
The same Latin sentence has been interpreted by a law professor (now teaching at
Oxford) in the following way:
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[although the term] judicial discretion’ is entrenched in legal jargon,
it always should be remembered that any discretion a judge may
exercise must be legal. Indeed, judicial power as distinguished from
the power of the laws, has no existence.253

This is in contrast to the view of some pragmatic judges who appear
to believe (in addition to legal discretion) that federal judges also enjoy
political discretion to “stamp the law with a personal vision.” 254 This is
not correct because, as explained in the next section, legal discretion is
distinct from political discretion.

4. Federal Judges Should Not Update Statutes because Legislators and
Judges Have Different Sources of Power, and Play Different Roles
Legal discretion is different from political discretion because
legislators and judges have different sources of power and play different
constitutional roles.255 Legislative power is based on politics.256 This is
“Coke himself was concerned . . . with the nature of the judicial
discretion . . . he wrote ‘Discretio est discernere per legem, quid sit
justum, Discretion is to know through law that which is just that is, to
discerne by the right line of law, and not by the crooked cord of private
opinion . . .. If you depart from the law, you will go astray, all things will
be uncertain to everybody…” M.R.L.L. Kelly, Common Law
Constitutionalism and the Oath of Governance “An Hieroglyphic of the
Laws”, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 121, 127 (2009).
What this means is that legal discretion is not unlimited, it is supposed to be
constrained by the “line of law” not the “crooked cord” of the judge’s private
opinion of what the law should be. Id. If legal discretion is not constrained “things
will be uncertain to everybody…”Id.
253

In re Marriage of McMahon, 403 N.E.2d 730, 738 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(Craven, J., dissenting) (quoting Lord Coke’s Discretio est discerne per legem quid
sit justum); see also David Skeels, Due Process and the Massachusetts Constitution,
84 MASS. L. REV. 76, 90 (1999) (“The authors of the Massachusetts Constitution
took seriously Coke’s warning that, even in misdemeanor cases, legislatures should
not substitute . . . ‘Tryals by Discretion’ for the precious ‘Tryal Per Legem Terrae’”
(meaning trial by a judge’s discretion, instead of trial according to the law of the
land) (emphasis added)). Finally, the importance of Lord Coke to the development of
law in the United States is demonstrated by the fact that he appears in a panel on the
bronze door at the entrance to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, Magna Carta and the Rule of Law, in MAGNA CARTA: MUSE & MENTOR
1–2 (Randy Holland ed. 2014).
254
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 197 (1995) ; See also RICHARD A.
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 9 (2008) (“[J]udges have . . . recourse to other sources
of judgment, including their own political opinions or policy judgements . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
255
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8–10; id. art. III, §§ 1–2.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss1/7

40

Newcombe: Textualism: Definition, and 20 Reasons Why Textualism is Preferab

2022]

TEXTUALISM AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

179

not only because legislators are elected and removed based on their
political positions, it is also because the Article I procedure for making
law is a political process involving the two elected branches of
government.257 Significantly, courts and judges do not have a role in the
political process for making law mandated by Article I.258 While
legislators can rely on their own convictions and social policy goals to
“reshape the law as they think it should be in the future,”259 federal
judges with only legal discretion “should do none of these things in a
democratic society.”260
F. Textualism is Preferable to Pragmatism Because Textualism is Based
on Law that Provides “Fair Notice” to Anyone Affected by it
The focus of pragmatic decision-making is on the future effects of a
decision, “‘rather than on the language of a statute or of a case, or more
generally on a pre-existing rule.’”261 The word “pre-existing” is
italicized to emphasize that textualists decide cases based on statutory
law that already exists, so as to provide fair notice to anyone affected by
their decision. Fair notice of the law is another reason why textualism is
preferable to pragmatism.262

1. Fair Notice and the Due Process Clause
During his confirmation hearing, Judge Gorsuch was asked by a
Senator what a judge should be “bounded by.”263 Judge Gorsuch stated
that you begin with the text because of due process and fair notice
considerations.264 He went on to explain that before he deprived
256

Id. at art. I, §§ 2–3.
Id. at art. I, §§ 2–3, 7.
258
Pushaw, supra note note 227, at 131 (“Article I excludes courts from the
legislative process.”); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 377–78 (1833) (“A more alarming
doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court than it was at liberty . . .
to decide for itself . . . It would have been justly deemed an approach to tyranny and
arbitrary power, to the exercise of mere discretion, and to the abandonment of all the
checks upon judicial authority.”).
259
Gorsuch, Lions, supra note 150, at 906.
260
Id. Instead, judges should apply existing law as it is, “not decide cases
based on their own moral convictions or policy consequences they believe might
serve society best.” Id.
261
WILKINSON, supra note 158 , at 82 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
262
Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 542 (2009)
(“Textualism’s emphasis on the primacy of the statutory text . . . suggest[s] . . . that
laws are legitimately enforced when their subjects have fair notice of them.”).
263
Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 10, at 130.
264
Id. at 131.
257
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someone of their liberty or property, he wanted to be sure that the person
was “on notice” that the law prohibited what they were doing.265
If a judge’s new interpretation of a federal statute is applied
retroactively to a defendant’s past conduct, then this has the potential to
violate the fair notice provision of the Due Process Clause. For example,
when he was on the Tenth Circuit, Judge Gorsuch decided a case
involving the issue of “fair notice” when a new statutory interpretation
was applied retroactively to a man who entered the United States
illegally.266 After the man (Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela) arrived from
Mexico, he decided to seek adjustment of his immigration status based
on an interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act in a Tenth
Circuit case titled Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales.267 Padilla held that the
Attorney General had the discretion to afford relief to individuals, like
Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela, “without insisting on a decade long waiting
period.”268 However, a new ruling in a case decided by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) provided a new interpretation.269 In fact,
the new BIA ruling reached a “conclusion directly at odds with the one”
the Tenth Circuit had reached in Padilla,270 which did not insist on a
decade long waiting period.
Writing for a majority of the Tenth Circuit, textualist Judge Gorsuch
held that “the retroactive application of new penalties to past conduct
that affected persons cannot now change denies them fair notice of the
law. . . .”271 He went on to point out that before the decision in the new
BIA case, the law in place in 2009 gave individuals, like Mr. GuitierrezBrizuela, two options: accept a ten-year waiting period outside the
country or seek an adjustment of status.272 Mr. Guitierrez-Brizuela chose
to seek an adjustment.273 In response to these facts, and out of a
textualist concern for the significant “fair notice” problem arising from
an interpretation of a law which was not pre-existing (and was about to
be applied to Mr. Guitierrez-Brizuela retroactively), Judge Gorsuch
ruled, “[t]he due process concerns are obvious: when Mr. GutierrezBrizuela made his choice, he had no notice of the law the BIA (Board of
Immigration Appeals) now seeks to apply.”274 Justice Gorsuch’s concern
about “notice” can also be seen in his statement that judges should not be
265

Id.
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1146 (10th Cir. 2016).
267
Id. at 1144 (citing Padilla-Cadera v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir.),
amended and superseded on reh’g, 453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2005)).
268
Id. (citing Gonzalez, 426 F.3d at 1299–301).
269
In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 371 (BIA 2007).
270
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144.
271
Id. at 1146.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id.
266
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free to insert something into a statute that they simply “made up,”275 and
doing so raises issues of fair notice under the Due Process Clause.276
G. Textualists Generally Favor Precedent
Another reason why textualism is preferable to pragmatism is
because textualists generally favor precedent;277 some pragmatists do
not.278 Precedent is created by an earlier court decision that provides the
basis for deciding later cases with similar issues.279
Like the text itself, precedent ordinarily operates as an external
constraint on the power of a federal judge.280 Textualists believe that
precedent is important because it limits the will of a federal judge to
decide cases, not on the basis of what the judge thinks the law should be,
275

Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 10, at 340.
Id. A few weeks after his confirmation hearing, Justice Gorsuch’s due
process concern that a defendant be given “notice” of the law was the basis for his
decision to side with Justice Breyer (and a criminal defendant) in Class v. United
States. 138 S. Ct. 798, 802 (2018). ). See also Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct.
1063, 1083 (2022) (Gorsuch, J. concurring in part). (In deciding in favor of a
criminal defendant, Justice Gorsuch emphasized the principle of fair notice, which
he explained “is about protecting an indispensable part of the rule of law…[that an
individual] can suffer penalties only for violating standing rules announced in
advance.”) (emphasis added).
277
The word “generally” was emphasized because some textualist justices are
willing to depart from precedent under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Gamble v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (judges do not
have to “adhere to an incorrect decision as precedent.”). Justice Thomas explained
that: “judicial decisions may incorrectly interpret the law . . . . A demonstrably
incorrect judicial decision . . . is tantamount to making law, and adhering to it . . .
perpetuates a usurpation of legislative power.” Id. (emphasis in the original); see
also Steven G. Calabresi & Todd W. Shaw, The Jurisprudence of Justice Samuel
Alito, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 507, 512 (2019) (while Justice Alito’s jurisprudence
is characterized by “a presumption in favor of precedent,” he will “depart from
precedent” under certain circumstances).
278
Posner, Pragmatism Versus, supra note 158, at 739 (“The point is not that
the judge has some kind of moral or even political duty to abide by precedent; that
would be formalism.” (emphasis added)).
279
Precedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). A justification for
following precedent is “notice.” GARNER, supra note 48, at 11 (“a respect for
precedent is said to advance notice and reliance interests . . . it’s no small thing to
ensure that citizens can determine in advance what the law will require of them and
have a chance to conform their conduct to it.”).
280
June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring) (“It has long been ‘an established rule to abide by former
precedents, where the same points come again in litigation; as well to keep the scale
of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's
opinion.’”) (citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
69 (1765)).
276
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but on the basis of what the law is. 281 For example, Justice Gorsuch
stated that, a judge’s job is to apply the law, not make it. 282 He explained
that the way to do this is to “start with precedent…we apply the
precedent we like, and the precedent we don’t like because our personal
views have nothing to do with our job.”283
In addition to its role in constraining the power of federal judges,
precedent is also important in preventing arbitrary decision-making
based simply on the “caprice or will” of a particular judge. 284 Alexander
Hamilton wrote about the need to avoid arbitrary decisions and suggested
that federal judges should be bound by “precedents which serve to define
and point out their duty. . . .”285
H. Textualist Decision-making is Based on What the Law Compels, Even
if the Judge May Not Personally “Like” the Result
In defining textualism, this article has discussed the fact that
sometimes textualist judges do not like the outcome of the decisions they
make.286 This is important because it tells us something about the
foundation of textualism. It tells us that the basis of a textualist judge’s
decision is something external to what the judge personally “likes”, and
therefore thinks should be the “right” decision. That external basis is
“the law.”287 For example, in a case involving the conviction of a man
who publicly burned an American flag as a form of protest, textualist
Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy joined Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun to rule in favor of the flag burner and hold that the
conviction violated the First Amendment.288 Justice Kennedy wrote the
following concurrence:
281

William D. Bader & David R. Cleveland, Precedent and Justice, 49 DUQ.
L. REV. 35, 40 (2011) (characterizing precedent “as a constraint on judges to justly
decide like cases alike rather than ruling according to their individual prejudices.”).
282
Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 10, at 340 (“the job of a judge
is not to make law but to interpret the law and to apply the law.”).
283
Id.
284
Anastoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 903–904 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated
235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (precedents “‘bind . . . cases of the same nature . . .. It
is on this account, that our law is justly deemed certain, . . . and not dependent upon
the caprice or will of judges.’”) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 377–78 (1833)).
285
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (ALEXANDER HAMILTON) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 2003) (Hamilton added that “the records of those precedents…must demand
long and laborious study to acquire competent knowledge of them.”).
286
See supra notes 43-45, and text accompanying notes 43–45.
287
SCALIA, supra note 4, at 22 (“The text [of a statute] is the law, and it is the
text that must be observed.”).
288
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989). With respect to the
“textualism” of Justices Kennedy and Scalia, “Justice Kennedy is considered a
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The hard fact is that sometimes we make decisions we do not like. We
make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and
the constitution …compel the result.
And so great is our
commitment to the process that, except in the rare case, we do not
pause to express distaste for the result, …This is one of those rare
cases.289

What this means is that textualist judges recognize that “the law” is
distinct from a judge’s personal views, and that it is the job of judges to
apply the law they don’t like, as well as the law they like.290
I. Constraint is the General Reason Why Textualism Should be Favored
Over Pragmatism and Other Methods of Statutory Interpretation
Textualism, like originalism, operates as a constraint on the power
of a federal judges to decide a case on the basis of what the law is. The
quotations from Justice Gorsuch cited throughout this article provide
examples of his textualist approach to statutory interpretation. However,
in addition to being a textualist, Justice Gorsuch is also an
“originalist.”291 While textualism is usually discussed as a method of
statutory interpretation, and originalism is discussed as a method of
constitutional interpretation,292 the two approaches share an important
goal. They are both designed to provide objective and external criteria
(e.g., the objective public meaning of words)293 to constrain the power of
federal judges.

textualist, if not so strong a textualist as Justices Scalia or Thomas.” Jonathan Z.
Cannon, Words and Words: The Supreme Court in Rapanos and Carabell, 25 VA.
ENV’T. L.J. 277, 306 (2007).
289
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420–21 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added);
see also Amul R. Thapar & Benjamin Beaton, The Pragmatism of Interpretation: A
Review of Richard A. Posner, the Federal Judiciary, 116 MICH. L. REV. 819, 832
(2018) (“Judges of very different . . . philosophical views often reach similar results.
Why? Because they accept that they are bound by the law.”).
290
See supra text accompanying notes 43–45.
291
Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 9, note 10, at 408. Former
Chief Judge Tacha (who served with Judge Gorsuch on the Tenth Circuit), testified
that “[h]is jurisprudence is informed by . . . originalism . . . .” Id.
292
O’Scannlain, All Textualists, supra note 1, at 309.
293
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 92
(2004) (suggesting that today’s originalism springs from the “objective meaning that
a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional provision
at the time of its enactment.” (emphasis added)). See also, Amanda L. Tyler et. al, A
Dialogue with Federal Judges on the Role of History in Interpretation, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1889, 1890 (2012) (textualist Judge Frank Easterbrook stated that: “I
care about the original public meaning of legal texts. What binds is the text that was
approved, … and not anybody’s hopes or plans or intent.” (emphasis added).
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The need for constraint on judges who might be tempted to
decide cases based, not on what the law is, but rather on what they think
law should be, is one reason why even some politically liberal scholars
supported Judge Gorsuch’s nomination. 294
For example, when
Georgetown Law School Professor Lawrence Solum appeared before the
Senate Judiciary Committee to support Judge Gorsuch’s nomination, he
declared that the original public meaning of words “should constrain
what judges do. . . .”295 This is the foundation not only of originalism,
but also of textualism, which has the goal of reducing or constraining
judicial discretion.296

1. Political Liberals Can Be Conservative Jurists and Scholars
Professor Solum also testified that he was not a Republican and that
he voted for Senator Feinstein, but he was convinced that giving judges
the power to impose their own view of law is “dangerous for
everyone.”297 Specifically, Professor Solum stated:
If you are a Democrat, and you know that the next justice to the
United States Supreme Court will be appointed by a Republican

294

See, e.g., Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 10, at 447.
Id,; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 269, 269 (2017) (describing the constraint principle of originalism as follows,
“[C]onstitutional practice should be constrained by that communicative content of
the text, which we can call the ‘original public meaning’ – the Constraint
Principle.”).
296
Manning, Judicial Restraint, supra note 98, at 754 (“the primary concern
[in constitutional interpretation] is to constrain the subjectivity of today’s
judges.”)(emphasis added); see also Easterbrook, Dead Hand, supra note 247, at
1122 (Textualist Judge Frank Easterbrook declared that “I took an oath to support
and enforce . . . the laws” [He goes on to ask whether anyone would surrender
power to someone who cannot be] “removed from office, nor disciplined, unless that
power were constrained? The constraint is the promise to abide by the rules (laws)
in place . . . .” )(emphasis added).
297
Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 10, at 447–48. Specifically,
Professor Solum testified that:
295

Originalism can and should be endorsed by both Democrats and
Republicans, by progressives and conservatives. This point is important
to me, personally. I am not a conservative; I am not a libertarian; I am
not a Republican. But I do believe in originalism. Why is that? It is
because I am convinced that giving power to judges to override the
Constitution to impose their own vision of constitutional law is
dangerous for everyone . . .. I support Judge Gorsuch’s nomination
because he is an originalist.
Id. at 448.
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president . . . would you prefer that an originalist like Judge Gorsuch
be appointed, or would you prefer a conservative justice who is a
living constitutionalist, who believes that their values are an
appropriate ground for modifying or overriding the constitutional
text?298

From his testimony, it appears that while Professor Solum may be a
political liberal, he is also a conservative jurist.
Professor Solum is not the only great scholar or jurist who is a
political liberal and a conservative jurist. Liberal Justice Hugo Black299
and former Stanford Professor John Hart Ely were too. Professor Ely
wrote that one “can be a genuine political liberal and at the same time
believe, out of respect for the democratic process, that the Court should
keep its hands off the legislature’s value judgments.”300

2. Approaches to Statutory Interpretation are Not Exclusive
It should be noted that the four approaches to statutory
interpretation discussed in this article are not exclusive. Instead, they
can blur into each other when put into actual practice.301 For example,
one federal judge commented that while the Supreme Court is
predominantly textualist, “the Justices themselves happily sign pragmatic
opinions written by Justice Breyer.”302 In addition, although Justice
Breyer has referred to his approach to decision-making as “pragmatic,”303
he relied on a purposivist approach in the Massachusetts v. E.P.A.
case.304
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Wooden v. United States305
provides another example of the fact that a justice’s interpretative
approach to statutory interpretation is not exclusive, and can include a

298

Id. (emphasis added).
Akhil Reed Amar, Rethinking Originalism, SLATE (Sept. 21, 2005),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2005/09/original-intent-for-liberals.html
[https://perma.cc/DC57-XJHT] (“perhaps the court’s most influential originalist in
history was the great Hugo Black – a liberal lion”)(emphasis added).
300
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 72 (1980) (emphasis on the
word “can” in the original, other emphasis added).
301
CROSS, supra note, 47 at 176 (“the justices’ use of different interpretive
methods may overlap in individual cases.”).
302
Easterbrook, Absence of Method, supra note 128, at 105.
303
BREYER, supra note 95, at 82.
304
Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 86 (2007) (In discussing the judicial lineup of the
Court in the case, two law professors referred to “Justices Stevens and Breyer, [as]
the Court’s most committed purposivists, …”).
305 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022).
299

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

47

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [], Art. 7

186

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

variety of approaches. The case involved interpretation of the word
“occasion” in a section of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). 306
The facts underlying the case began in 1997 when William Wooden
broke into a storage facility, stole items from ten storage units, and pled
guilty to ten counts of burglary.307 In 2014, he was convicted for “being a
felon in possession of a firearm” after a policeman saw guns in his
house.308 The punishment for this crime “varies significantly” if ACCA
applies, since the statute subjects a defendant to an enhanced penalty if
the defendant had three or more felony convictions “‘committed on
occasions different from one another’[citing] 18 U.S.C. §924e(1).”309
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether
the defendant “committed his crimes on a single occasion, or on ten
separate ones.”310 Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan concluded that
Wooden’s burglary convictions arose from a “single criminal episode”
and therefore, would only count once under the ACCA.311
Justice Kagan began her opinion with a discussion of how “an
ordinary person” would describe Wooden’s ten burglaries.312 She
concluded that the person would group his entries “as happening on a
single occasion” rather than ten occasions.313 Justice Kagan also
consulted two dictionary definitions of the word occasion.314 She
concluded that the definition of “occasion” can include e.g., an
“episode—which is simply to say, such an occasion—may itself
encompass multiple, temporarily distinct activities.” 315 In addition to
relying on textualist tools like dictionaries, and the meaning of words to
an ordinary person, Justice Kagan also relied on the legislative history of
the occasions clause, as well as ACCA’s statutory purpose.316
All of
the above reasons, taken from different methods of statutory
interpretation, led Justice Kagan to hold that the defendant’s ten
306 Id. at 1067 (a section of the ACCA applies to convictions “ ‘committed on

occasions different from one another.’ [citing] 18 U.S.C. 924 (e)(1).”)
307 Id. at 1067.
308
Id. at 1067-1068.
309 Id. at 1068.
310 Id. at 1069.
311 Id. at 1067.
312
Id. at 1069. See supra notes 24-28 (discussing the ordinary meaning rule
as a tool of textualist statutory interpretation).
313
Id.
314 Id. See supra notes 29-31 (discussing the dictionary definition of words as
an aid to textualist statutory interpretation).
315 Id. See supra notes 29-30 (discussing the dictionary definition of words as
an aid to textualist statutory interpretation).
316 Id. at 1072. (“Statutory history and purpose confirm our view of the
occasion’s clause’s meaning”).
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convictions for burglary “were for offenses committed on a single
occasion. They therefore only count once under ACCA.”317
J. The Intellectual Roots of Pragmatism Lie in a Philosophy of
Relativism
Another reason why textualism is preferable to pragmatism is
because the foundation of legal pragmatism lies in the philosophy of
relativism,318 and relativism is egocentric and uncertain. Specifically,
scholars describe relativism (in the context of judicial decision-making)
as an approach that is egocentric, which varies “systematically with the
speaker.”319 The consequences of this relativist egocentric approach for
statutory interpretation purposes are significant. It means that the
outcome of judicial decisions can simply be the egocentric expressions of
who the decision-maker is, not what the law is.320 For example, if one
person states that “killing cats for sport is wrong,” a relativist might state
that “killing cats for sport is not compatible with the mores of my social
group.”
The latter expression is a statement of “egocentric
expression.”321
Similarly, legal pragmatism has been described in a relativistic way
as based on “our norms.”322 Specifically, one law professor wrote: “So
how, under a pragmatist theory, do we adjudicate between conflicting
norms of justification? The only possible response is that our assertions
and actions are justified relative to our norms. Those on the other side
can say the same thing.”323
Judge Richard Posner underlined
pragmatism’s relativism when he wrote that a pragmatist is skeptical
about final truth or certitudes because these are simply the result of
“beliefs current in whatever community we happen to belong to, beliefs
that may be the uncritical reflection of our upbringing…or social
milieu.”324

317 Id. at 1074.
318

Richard Warner, Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in
Critical Theory, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 535, 554 (1993) (discussing pragmatism’s
relativism); see also John Mikhail, Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard
Posner's the Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1057,
1061–62 (2002) (Judge “Posner rejects the existence of any such universals and
affirms a version of moral relativism . . . .”).
319
Peter F. Lake, Posner’s Pragmatist Jurisprudence, 73 NEB. L. REV. 545,
613 (1994) (citation omitted).
320
Id. (emphasis added).
321
Id.
322
Warner, supra note 318, at 554 (emphasis added).
323
Id.
324
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 254, at 5 (1995).
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As well as being egocentric, relativism is also subjective and
uncertain. As the examples above show, decisions based on a
philosophy of relativism vary depending on who the decisionmaker is,
what “community” or social group they belong to, or what their “norms”
are. Obviously, not all judges come from the same social group or
embrace the same norms. These are all subjective factors. Textualism,
with its emphasis on the objective ordinary meaning of the words
contained in a statute’s text, is preferable to pragmatism because a
pragmatist’s relativistic decision can be subjective and uncertain. These
are consequences which undermine the rule of law.
K. The Intellectual Roots of Pragmatism Also Lie in a Philosophy of
Realism. “Realists” Begin with the “Right” Outcome First, Whereas
Textualists are Rule Orientated

1. Textualism is a Rule Oriented Species of Formalism
Textualism and formalism overlap.325 As Justice Scalia declared,
“[o]f all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is
that it is ‘formalistic.’ The answer to that is, course it’s formalistic! The
rule of law is about form.” 326 The basis of formalistic decision-making
is “decision-making according to rule.”327 Professor Thomas C. Grey has
divided formalists into concept formalists and rule formalists.328
According to Judge Richard Posner, “modern American formalists—
comprising what one might call the School of Scalia—are mainly ruleformalists.” 329

325
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:
Toward a Fact Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 U. VA. L. REV. 1295,
1349 n.252 (1990)(“Notice the considerable overlap between formalism and
textualism.”).
326
SCALIA, supra note 4, at 25 (emphasis in the original).
327
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988).
328
Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 473, 478 (2003) [hereinafter “Grey, Judicial Review”] (“Legal formalists
emphasize the specifically legal virtues of the clarity, determinacy, and coherence of
law…they can be divided into rule-formalists and concept-formalists. The former
place more value on determinacy emphasizing the importance of clear rules and
strict interpretation. . . .”).
329
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 8 n.16 (2008) (citing but not
quoting Grey, Judicial Review, supra note 328, at 479).
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2. Textualists Believe that Judicial Decisions Should Be Based on
General Rules of Law, Rather Than a Judge’s Personal (and therefore
Subjective) Discretion
In an article titled, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,330 Justice
Scalia argued in favor of decision-making based on general rules of law,
rather than a “personal discretion to do justice.”331 General rules of law
should be preferred because they are the product of the branch of
government responsible to the people and because they promote equal
treatment and predictability.332 Predictability is important because
people subject to law should know “what it prescribes.” 333 This is in
contrast to decision-making based on a judge’s personal discretion.334
This type of personal decision-making, rather than promoting
predictability, creates uncertainty, and uncertainty is not compatible with
the rule of law.335

3. Textualism is Based on Authoritative Sources
As well as decision-making according to rules, another foundation
of formalism and textualism is the belief that law is based on
“authoritative sources like legislative and judicial decisions.”336 This
source-based view of law is important because these sources constrain
the power of judges,337and therefore limit the potential for arbitrary
decisions.

4. Pragmatists Believe the Law is an Instrumental Means to an End
and Embrace and Philosophy of Realism
The role of statutory law for textualists is different from the role
statutory law can play for pragmatists. For textualists, the words in the
330

Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 182, at 1175.
Id. at 1176.
332
Id. at 1176, 1178 (“The Equal Protection Clause epitomizes justice . . . the
trouble with the discretion-conferring approach . . . [like pragmatism] is that it does
not satisfy this sense of justice very well.”).
333
Id. at 1179.
334
Id. at 1178. Justice Scalia characterizes this type of discretion as a
“common-law, discretion-conferring approach.” Id.
335
Id. at 1179; see also Thapar & Beaton, supra note 289, at 832 (discussing
the “fracturing effects of pragmatism” compared to “[f]ocusing on the law as written
[which] narrows disagreement in the appellate courts . . . .” (emphasis added)). The
authors add that this results in judges with different philosophical views reaching
similar results because “they accept that they are bound by the law.” Id.
336
David Lyons, Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism-a Pathological Study,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 949, 952 (1981).
337
Id. at 953.
331
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text of a federal statute contain rules of law to be followed, even if the
judge may not personally like the result.338 For legal pragmatists, law is
an instrumental means to obtain “socially desired ends.”339
This brings us to the fact that, as well as relativism, another
philosophical component of legal pragmatism is realism.340 Realism is
based on the theory that (in reality), “it is not law that rules.”341 Realists
believe that objective legal decisions are illusory since they are really the
result of a judge’s own “subjectively desired ends.”342 One law professor
cautions that if judges base legal decisions on “their personal views” then
the ideal of the rule of law would become a fraud.343

5. Realist Judges Often Begin with the “Right” Outcome First
When a textualist judge decides a case involving interpretation of a
federal statute, the judge’s discretion is supposed to be constrained by the
objective meaning of the words in the text of the statute which has been
enacted into a law.344 This is in contrast to some pragmatic judges who
begin with their subjective opinion of what the “right” outcome should
be.345 The judge then instructs his or her law clerk to reason backward to
find cases or statutes for support.346 This appears to be decision-making
in reverse.
338

See supra notes 286-290.
THOMAS C. GREY, FORMALISM AND PRAGMATISM IN AMERICAN LAW 121–
22 (2014); see also Posner, Offer Law, supra note 77, at 1670 (“All that pragmatic
jurisprudence really connotes . . . is a rejection of law as grounded in permanent
principles . . . and a determination to use law as an instrument for social ends.”); see
also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 6 (2006) (describing the
range of “ends” that instrumentalists might want to achieve).
340
Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist
Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1571 (1990) (pragmatism has a focus on
“philosophical realism . . ..”); see also POPKIN, supra note 9, at 153 (characterizing
pragmatism as imparting “a sense of realism to the interpretive process . . . .”).
341
Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of
Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REV. 195, 211 (2009).
342
TAMANAHA, supra note 339, at 236.
343
Id.
344
Id.
345
Patricia Manson, Richard Posner Announces Retirement, CHICAGO DAILY
L.
BULL.
(Sept.
6,
2017),
https://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/archives/2017/09/01/retirement-9-1-17 []
346
In-person interview in Washington D.C. on April 7, 2019 with an attorney
who worked as a law clerk for a federal judge. The attorney wishes to remain
anonymous. See also Posner, Self-Restraint, supra note 78, at 539. “Judges who
don’t insist that a legalistic algorithm will decide every case are what I call
“pragmatists,” . . . in the sense of an approach to decision making that emphasizes
consequences over doctrine. Stated otherwise, pragmatists fit doctrine around
consequences.” Id. (emphasis added). Put another way, pragmatists fit case law and
339
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Determining the “right” outcome first, and then reasoning
backward from it, is part of a philosophy of realism and an instrumental
view of law which grew out of it.347 While pragmatists are inclined to
follow an instrumental view of law to arrive at a preferred result, a noninstrumental (e.g., textualist) judge “is committed to following the
applicable legal rules no matter what the outcome.”348
Perhaps the most famous practitioner of a realist approach to
judicial decision-making was Justice William O. Douglas.349 Professor
Melvin Urofsky concluded that “Douglas went right from question to
result with only the barest justification . . . .”350 Professor G. Edward
White believes that Douglas rejected constraints on subjective judicial
lawmaking (such as “fidelity to constitutional text”)351 because of his
belief that law was not a body of immutable principles, but rather
“nothing more than politics,”352 and that he was no different than a
legislator.353 As a result, Justice Douglas “was constrained only by the
rightness or wrongness of his political philosophy.”354
statutory law around a desired result. Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES
THINK 84 (2008).
It might seem that judges would legislate only after they
had tried and failed to decide a case by reference to orthodox
materials like legislative text and precedent . . .. But others [no
doubt referring to pragmatic judges] reverse the sequence. They
start by making the legislative judgment, that is, by asking
themselves what outcome – not just who wins and who loses, but
what rule or standard or principle enunciated in their judicial
opinion – would have the best consequences. Only then do they
consider whether that outcome is blocked by orthodox materials .
. . [and the] costs that it would impose on impairing legalistic
values such as legal stability. Id. (emphasis added).
See also supra, notes 81–87, which contains a similar description of Judge
Posner’s pragmatic way of deciding cases.
347
Woolhandler, supra note 160, at 115 (“the instrumental view of law that
grew out of the realist era, [embraces the view] that a good legal rule is one that
causes a desirable social end.”); see also TAMANAHA, supra note 339, at 6–7 (“An
instrumental understanding of law means that law . . . is consciously viewed by
people and groups as a tool or means with which to achieve ends. . . . [L]awyers with
a non-instrumental view, in contrast, will accord greater respect for the binding
quality of legal rules.” (emphasis in original)).
348
TAMANAHA, supra note 339, at 7.
349
Melvin Urofsky, William O. Douglas As A Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE
L.J. 133, 138 (1991).
350
Id. at 134–35.
351
G. Edward White, The Anti-Judge: William O. Douglas and the Ambiguities
of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REV. 17, 18 (1988).
352
Id. at 46.
353
Id. at 48.
354
Id.
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CONCLUSION
Although he was critical of Justice Douglas, legal pragmatist
Richard A. Posner echoed some of the Justice’s realist philosophy when
he issued the following statement on the day he announced his retirement
from the Seventh Circuit:355 “I am proud to have promoted a pragmatic
approach to judging … and to have had the opportunity to apply my view
that judicial opinions should be easy to understand and that judges
should focus on the right and wrong in every case.”356
This statement raises the question of right or wrong according to
who, or according to what? Is it right or wrong according to the
objective ordinary meaning of words contained in the text of a statute
enacted by Congress, or is it right or wrong according to subjective
criteria such as what an individual federal judge thinks the “right”
outcome should to be?
Ultimately, resolution of this question becomes part of three larger
questions. The first question is what role should a judge’s own personal
or political opinions take in deciding an issue of statutory interpretation?
Textualists believe they should play no role, and that a judge should
decide cases on the basis of what the law is, even though the judge may
not personally like the result.
A second question is whether federal judges should undertake
the task of “updating” (in reality amending) federal statutes. Pragmatists
believe that the answer is yes. Textualists believe that the answer is no.
This is because textualists believe that the task of making a statute
“better” should be left to the political branches who created the statute,
not federal court judges.357
Closely related is a third question. This is the question of who
should decide public policy issues. Should unelected federal judges,
deliberately isolated from politics by life tenure appointments and with
no political mandate, be able to decide which side of a controversial
political issue is right or wrong? Textualists take the position that it is

355
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 254, at 393. I am not suggesting
that Judge Posner agreed with every aspect of Justice Douglas’s decision-making. In
fact, Judge Posner appeared to criticize Justice Douglas when he wrote that “[t]here
were first rate legal scholars among the realists . . . but there [was] also . . . the
judicial performance of William Douglas . . . .” Id. However, Judge Posner did place
Justice Douglas on a list of justices he categorized as “pragmatists.” Richard A.
Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
356
Patricia Manson, Richard Posner Announces Retirement, CHICAGO DAILY
L.
BULL.,
(Sept.
6,
2017),
https://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/archives/2017/09/01/retirement-9-1-17
[https://perma.cc/PQ7W-M9KU] (emphasis added).
357
See supra notes 231-240.
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Congress, the branch of government accountable to the people, who
should decide public policy issues.
No matter how well-meaning a federal judge is, and no matter how
much one may “like” the result of a particular case, any tilt towards
result driven decision-making (without the constraint of the objective
meaning of the words contained in the text of a statute enacted by
Congress) threatens to replace our nation of laws with a nation of judges.
After all, as Justice Gorsuch stated, “This is a democracy at the end of
the day. It is not an oligarchy of judges.”358

358

Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, supra note 10, at 340.
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